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Abstract 
This dissertation consists of two empirical papers that explore recent phenomena in Banking and 
Microfinance Performance. Chapter 1, “Market Power and Bank Performance in MENA Countries,” 
examines the determinants of market power in 12 Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries 
in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), specifically within six Gulf Cooperation Countries 
and six non-Gulf countries. We examine the dynamics of bank competition in MENA countries, provide 
an up-to-date assessment of market power, investigate the factors impacting bank competition, and 
explore the evolution of market power during the financial crisis. Our results show an overall increase in 
market power following the GFC for both regions. We find that bank size, capitalization, and 
diversification affect market power differently in the pre-crisis and post-crisis years. Larger banks enjoy 
cost advantages and the diversification impact on market power has decreased in the post-crisis years and 
the impact of capitalization on market power increased during the GFC. Overall, banks with higher 
capitalization can better weather the crisis. Chapter 2, “The impact of firm-level characteristic and 
county-specific attributes on the performance and efficiency of the Microfinance institutions,” estimates 
the impact of country-specific macro-variables and firm-specific attributes on the financial performance 
and the efficiency of microfinance institutions (MFIs). We use a large international up-to-date database 
consisting of over 10,000 firm-years for MFIs over 89 countries during the period 2008-2015. Several 
interesting findings emerge: a) regulation and outreach are negatively correlated. b) There is a negative 
and highly statistically significant correlation between the percentage of female borrowers and loan size, 
which is evidence of “mission drift”. c) An increase in the percentage of female board member has 
positive and statistically significant effect on MFIs profitability and ROA; which emphasizes the 
importance of female participation in leading position in MFIs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Market Power; MENA countries; Global Financial Crisis; Microfinance Institutions; 
Performance and efficiency; Macro and financial determinants; female empowerment 
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Chapter 1 
Market Power and Bank Performance in MENA Countries 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
During the last decade, many MENA countries implemented financial reforms to improve their 
business environments and promote financial development. The financial markets of several Middle 
Eastern countries have shown dramatic changes. Turkey emerged as a powerful regional leader with a 
strong economy and more developed financial system. The economies of the Gulf Arab countries have 
experienced tremendous growth, and their financial systems have experienced significant reforms. 
Espinoza (2014) reports that the classification of the UAE and Qatar has been upgraded from “frontier” 
market status to “emerging” market status.  
The financial reforms in MENA countries affect several aspects of the financial system. Espinoza 
(2014) reports that “most countries in the region have reduced the share of state banks through 
restructuring and privatization and allowed the entry of new private banks, including foreign banks.” The 
Global Financial Crisis impacted financial systems around the world. Yet, its impact on MENA countries 
was less significant than elsewhere since the financial systems in these countries are less integrated than 
those used in the rest of the world.  
The main objective of this study is to examine the dynamics of bank competition in MENA 
countries. Even though prior research on bank competition has been conducted for developed and 
emerging markets, little research exists for MENA countries. This work intends to fill this gap. 
This paper contributes to the literature in the following ways: First, it provides an up-to-date 
assessment of market power in MENA countries. Second, it examines the determinants of bank 
competition in these countries. Third, it explores the evolution of market power in MENA countries 
during the Global Financial Crisis and examines the impact of this crisis on bank competition in these 
countries. Fourth, it examines the determinants of bank net interest margins (NIM) and explores the 
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impact of market structure, interest rates volatility, Legal Rights Index, and Credit Information Index on 
NIM. 
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. The Determinants of Market Power in MENA Countries and the Impact of the Global 
Financial Crisis  
Examining competitiveness in the banking sector of MENA countries is of considerable interest. 
This is due, first, to the reforms that are taking place in many MENA countries and policymakers’ need 
for theoretical and empirical research. Second, there is a large body of literature that finds a strong 
correlation between competition and bank performance, efficiency, and stability.  
2.1.1 Structural and Non-Structural Approaches 
Research on bank competition is focused on two major approaches: structural and non-structural.  
The structural approaches: 
Two paradigms are covered under the structural approach: the structure-conduct-performance 
(SCP) and the efficient structure. Efthyvoulou and Yildirim (2014) define the SCP paradigm as the 
situation that occurs when market concentration increases and firms with higher monopoly power can 
charge higher prices and thus earn higher profits. Berger et al. (2003) argue that banking industry 
concentration and other barriers to competition create an environment that “affects bank conduct and 
performance in unfavorable ways from social points." The SCP hypothesis is tested using measures of 
concentration such as the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and the n-firm concentration ratio (CRn). 
Berger and Hannan (1998) test the “quiet life" hypothesis by finding whether firms with market 
power in concentrated markets can ignore minimizing costs without risking an exit from the industry. The 
authors show that when a firm is not under pressure to minimize costs, its cost efficiency will be reduced. 
Hannan (1991) assesses the relationship between bank behavior and market power, as measured by the 
HHI and the CRn, and finds that firms exercising market power increase the rate charged for loans while 
decreasing the rate offered for these loans. The results are consistent with the SCP hypothesis. In contrast 
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to the SCP hypothesis, Smirlock et al. (1984) suggest the “efficient structure” hypothesis, which provides 
a different interpretation. These authors argue that market power emerges from competition. Competition 
occurs when firms have a comparative advantage, which they then use to be more efficient and thus earn 
economic rent. The authors find that the efficient structure hypothesis is better at describing the 
relationship between market structure and firm conduct. Rhoades (1985), Shepherd (1986), and Smirlock 
(1985) find results that provide support for the efficient structure hypothesis. 
The non-structural approach: 
In contrast to the structural approach, the non-structural approach suggests that market power 
does not exclude competition if firms are consumer-centric. Baumol (1982) argues that when there is 
completely free entry and exit, monopolists can prevent new entry if they provide the consumers with a 
competitive product. Lack of efforts to produce such a product makes the firms susceptible to “hit-and-
run entry." Besanko and Thakor (1992) confirm Baumol's result by finding that competition is driven by 
the threat of new entry. Baumol et al. (1982) show that market power is not the only indicator of 
competitiveness. Claessens and Laeven (2004) argue that testing for competition requires a structural, 
contestability approach. Banking market power is not the only factor that impacts bank conduct. It is 
important, they argue, to account for other factors such as entry barriers, along with foreign ownership, 
and the activity restrictions severity. These results are of considerable interest to policymakers in MENA 
countries who are undertaking series of reforms to better shape the banking system and promote 
economic growth. 
2.1.2 The International Orientation of the New Research 
Though early research was limited to local U.S. banking markets, the current literature has an 
international orientation that includes developed as well as developing countries. Some more recent 
studies focus on the European banking markets and the dynamics of bank competition, European banking 
system evolution, and the impact of deregulation and large-scale consolidation on competition. For 
example, Angelini and Cetorelli (2003) analyze the evolution of competitive conditions in the Italian 
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banking industry. Their findings support the hypothesis that deregulation contributes to bank competition 
improvement.  
Unlike other studies that rely on a single indicator to determine the degree of banking market 
competition, Carbó et al. (2009) use five indicators of competition: net interest margin, Lerner index, 
return on assets, H-statistic, and HHI market concentration. The study shows that the five indicators 
comparison finds conflicting predictions of competitive behavior. This occurs across countries, within 
countries, and over time. The authors suggest that research should take country-specific factors into 
account when examining banking market competition. Bolt and Humphrey (2010) provide an alternative 
indicator to the Lerner index. They apply a competition frontier to a panel of 11 European countries from 
1987-2006. The European countries were ranked by their dispersion from the competition efficiency 
frontier. They find that non-interest income generating activities have less competition, while activities 
that produce spread income have higher competition.   
 Weill (2013) analyzes the evolution and convergence in EU bank competition from 2002-2010. 
He uses the Lerner index and Rosse-Panzar model to estimate bank competition for all EU countries. He 
tests for beta and sigma convergence and finds an increase in bank competition during the 2000s. He also 
finds evidence that clearly supports the view of convergence in bank competition across European 
countries.   
Berger et al. (2008) test the “competition-fragility” and “competition-stability” theories using 
data for 8,235 banks in 23 developed countries. Although the authors find some support for one of the 
elements of the ’competition-stability’ view, the main result is that banks that have more market power 
also have less risk exposure overall, which is consistent with the “competition-fragility” view.  
2.1.3 Variability of Bank Competition 
Recent studies examine the factors impacting the variability and dynamics of bank competition. 
De Guevara et al. (2005) study how bank competition has evolved in five large European banking 
industries—Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom—using the Lerner Index for the 
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period 1992-1999. The authors find that concentration is persisting in European banks despite the 
implementation of deregulation. They contend that this results from low level of bank integration. De 
Guevara and Maudos (2007) analyze Spanish banking system market power explanatory factors from 
1986-2002. They find an increase of market power from the mid-1990s. The authors find that size, 
efficiency, and specialization have a significant impact on market power. This result allows them to 
conclude that there is no solid foundation for making economic policy decisions on accepting or refusing 
a bank merger process based on market concentration effects. 
2.1.4 The Impact of Foreign Bank Participation in Bank Competition 
More recent literature focuses on the impact of foreign bank participation on bank competition. 
This body of work is of particular interest to the research on MENA countries since these countries are in 
the process of restructuring the banking system and allowing the entry of foreign banks. Gelos and Roldos 
(2004) apply the Panzar and Rosse methodology in a sample of eight emerging countries. They find that 
although bank consolidation led to a decrease in the number of banks, concentration did not increase from 
this decline. They show that this result occurs for countries that allowed the participation of foreign banks 
and have lower barriers to entry. Fungáčová et al. (2010) analyze the Russian banking sector from 2001-
2006 and did not find a persistence of competitiveness of foreign-owned banks over state-owned banks.  
2.1.5 Bank Ownership and Market Power 
Recent research focuses on the sources of market power and whether bank ownership impacts 
market power. Foreign bank performance improves over time, as they adjust to the new environment 
(Claessens and van Horen, 2012). Their results reflect that the performance improves when the home 
country has a closer geographical or cultural proximity (but not institutional) to the host country. Buch et 
al. (2013) use the Lerner index and study the impact of internationalization on market power and find that 
large banks that are internationally active banks possess considerable market power. Efthyvoulou and 
Yildirim (2014) explore how the Global Financial Crisis impacts market power by studying Central and 
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Eastern European banking markets. The authors find that convergence is present in country-level market 
power throughout the pre-crisis period and the Global Financial Crisis. 
2.1.6 Islamic Banking 
Recently, a new body of literature has focused on Islamic banking. Hassan et al. (2013) conduct a 
comparative analysis of foreign and domestic bank performance and examine the critical determinants of 
foreign bank entry in 24 selected Islamic countries for the period 1996- 2010. The authors find that 
foreign Islamic banks enjoy a higher net profit margin in host countries. And the domestic Islamic bank 
profitability has been strongly affected by the Global Financial Crisis. Ariss Rima Turk (2010) analyzes 
the competitive conditions in Islamic and conventional markets in a sample of banks in 13 countries from 
2000-2006 and finds that Islamic banks are better capitalized and allot a larger proportion of their assets 
to financing activities in comparison to conventional banks. Hassan et al. (2014) explain the reasons 
behind the birth and growth of Islamic banking and finance and list the terms and contracts used in 
Islamic finance (Al-Wadia Principle, Al-Murabaha, Al-Musharka, Bai-Muajjal). They describe the 
financial landscape of the MENA region and conduct an empirical analysis of Islamic banking in MENA 
countries. They find that 1. The efficiency of Islamic banks in the MENA region is positively influenced 
by regulations related to the second and third pillars of Basel 2. Stricter regulations, related to the first 
pillar, such as capital requirements have a positive impact on Islamic banks profitability. Alam and 
Hassan (2015) analyze the competition and risk-taking behavior of 59 Islamic banks and 149 
conventional banks in 10 emerging countries for the period 2006-2013. They find that “competition and 
risk are negatively related to conventional banks and inversely related to Islamic banks.” 
Belkhir et al. (2016) examine the correlation between political risk and the variability of Islamic 
and conventional banks’ assets. Their results reflect that “political risk is positively related to the 
volatility of conventional banks’ assets but is not a statistically relevant factor in explaining the volatility 
of Islamic banks’ assets." Bitar et al. (2016) study the impact of types of bank capital on the profitability 
and efficiency of both conventional and Islamic banks. They find that capital of high quality improves the 
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profitability and efficiency of both systems. Yet, their results appear stronger for conventional banks. 
Bitar et al. (2016) investigate the determinants of Islamic bank capital ratios and determine that Islamic 
banks with higher capitalization are smaller, more profitable and highly liquid. Grira et al. (2016) study 
the ex-ante cost of equity of Islamic and conventional banks. Their findings show that the Islamic banks 
have, on average, higher equity financing costs than conventional banks. Bitar et al. (2016) examine the 
country-level determinants of Islamic bank capital and discover that smaller, more profitable and liquid 
Islamic banks are more highly capitalized. 
2.2. Net Interest Margin 
2.2.1 Macroeconomic and Microeconomic Factors Impacting the Margin 
At the macroeconomic level, several factors are documented in the literature. Ho and Saunders 
(1981) argue that interest rate volatility is a major concern for banks and that this fact stems from the 
intermediary function of banks, since banks increasingly rely on interest-sensitive short-term liabilities, 
while making long-term loans that are insensitive to the interest rate. The authors develop a model that 
examines the determinants of interest rate margin. Their model was extended and tested by several other 
authors. Allen (1988) extends the model and demonstrates that when considering cross-elasticities of 
demand between bank products, pure interest spread may be reduced. Angbazo (1997) also extends the 
Ho and Saunders (1981) theory by testing the hypothesis that “banks with more risky loans and higher 
interest-rate risk exposure would select loan and deposit rates to achieve higher net interest margin.” The 
results support his hypothesis. Saunders and Schumacher (2000) test the model by examining the 
determinants of bank net interest margins (NIMs) in six European countries and the U.S. from 1988–
1995. They find that, as banks’ monopoly power increases, their spreads go higher and interest rate 
volatility significantly impacts bank NIM. 
Some of the literature focuses on the impact of the efficiency of the legal system. Bae and Goyal 
(2004) study the impact of property rights on loan spreads on international bank loans. They find that 
when creditors’ rights are weak, banks demand higher interest rates to compensate for risk. As the 
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protection of property rights increases, the spread decreases. Laeven and Majnoni (2005) find that by 
improving the enforceability of loan contracts, the cost of financial intermediation will be lower. Qian and 
Strahan (2007) find that the variability of the term of bank loans can be greatly explained by legal and 
institutional differences. Bae and Goyal (2009) find that “banks respond to poor enforceability of 
contracts by reducing loan amounts, shortening loan maturities, and increasing loan spreads." These 
findings are important for MENA countries where the legal system is weak, and there is poor 
enforceability of contracts. Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2004) find that liquidity and GDP growth have a 
negative impact on interest rate margins. Afanasieff et al. (2001) show that macroeconomic conditions are 
the main determinants of bank interest spreads in Brazil.  
At the microeconomic level, several bank-specific or industry-specific factors that affect interest 
rates are documented in the literature. Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2004) find that bank characteristics play a 
major role in explaining the within-country variation in financial intermediary costs. Claessens et al. 
(2001) find that the entry of foreign banks makes national banks more efficient and competitive. They 
also argue that one the downsides of foreign bank entry is that by increasing competition and thus 
reducing profits, national banks may become more vulnerable. And this may jeopardize the financial 
system. These results are of significant interest to policymakers in MENA countries who are assessing the 
impact of foreign bank entry on the efficiency and competition of the banking system. Claeys and Vander 
Vennet (2004) assert that concentration, operational efficiency, capital adequacy, and risk behavior are 
important determinants of margins in both the West and the East. Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) 
show that the net interest rate is smaller for countries with more competition in the banking sector and 
that it is higher for well-capitalized banks. Nys (2003) demonstrates that there is a positive and significant 
impact of default risk, administrative costs, and opportunity costs on NIM in most European countries. 
Estrada et al. (2006) analyze the determinants of interest margins in Colombia. Their results suggest that 
interest margins are primarily affected by credit institutions’ inefficiency and by credit risk exposure and 
market power. Horváth (2009) examines the determinants of interest rate margins of Czech banks. He 
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finds that the determinants of interest rate margins of Czech banks are largely similar to those in 
developed countries. 
2.2.2 The relationship Between Net Interest Margin and Non-Traditional Banking Activities  
The literature shows that financial reforms lead to an increase in bank competition, especially on 
the part of non-banking financial institutions, which compete with traditional banks on deposits as well as 
on loans. And this, in turn, brings about a decline in NIMs. Smith et al. (2003) examine interest and non-
interest income variability and their correlation in banking systems in EU countries. They find that non-
interest income has increased in importance relative to net interest income. They also find that the 
evolution of non-interest income does not fully offset the reduction in the interest margin. Lepetit et al. 
(2008) investigate the relationship between bank risk and product diversification in the European banking 
industry. They find that banks expanding into non-interest income activities present a higher risk and 
higher insolvency risk than banks that mainly supply loans. Rogers and Sinkey (1999) examine the 
characteristics of banks that are heavily engaged in nontraditional off-balance-sheet activities. They find 
that these banks have smaller NIMs, have relatively fewer core deposits, and exhibit less risk.  
Some of the recent literature focuses on the impact of the Global Financial Crisis on bank income 
diversification. Williams (2016) examines bank revenue composition and bank risk in Australia. He finds 
that banks with a lower level of non-interest income and high revenue concentration are less risky. 
DeYoung and Torna (2013) examine the failure of U.S. banks during the financial crisis. They find that 
"bank failure declined with pure fee-based nontraditional activities such as securities brokerage and 
insurance sales, but increased with asset-based nontraditional activities such as venture capital, 
investment banking and asset securitization." Engle et al. (2014) study the impact of bank concentration 
on the choice of business activities. They find that a one-to-one relationship is not always between non-
traditional activities and the stability of global banks. Brunnermeier et al. (2012) find that banks that have 
higher non-interest income have contributed more to systemic risk than traditional banking.” 
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3.  METHODOLOGY 
To examine market power, we follow Weill (2011), de Guevara et al. (2005), and Carbó et al. 
(2009) and estimate the Lerner index. Then, we employ an empirical specification to estimate the 
determinants of market power.  
3.1 The Lerner Index 
The Lerner index is defined as the difference between price and marginal cost, divided by price. 
The cost function is specified by Weill (2011) as follows: 
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Where TC denotes total costs; y total assets; 1w the price of labor (the ratio of personal expenses 
to total assets); 2w the price of physical capital (the ratio of other non-interest expenses to total assets); 
3w the price of the borrowed funds (the ratio of paid interest to all funding); and iCountry  denotes a 
dummy variable for the country i. Total costs are the sum of personnel expenses, other non-interest 
expenses, and paid interest. The estimated cost function coefficients are used to compute the marginal 
cost. 
3.2 The Determinants of Market Power: Model Specification 
We follow Efthyvoulou and Yildirim (2014) in estimating the determinants of market power and 
employ the following empirical specification: 
ittitit uYXL                (2) 
Where X is a vector of bank-level control variables; Y is a vector of macroeconomic control 
variables; u is an i.i.d. error term; and i, t index bank and time, respectively.  
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In the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis and its impact on the world economy, analysis of 
the factors impacting market power in MENA countries is of great importance, especially for 
policymakers who are debating the type and intensity of reforms and regulations that will create an 
efficient and stable banking system. Such analysis will help policymakers answer the following question: 
what are the optimal bank capitalization, income diversification, size, assets risk, and funding preference?  
3.2.1 Bank-Level Variables 
• Bank capitalization is measured by total equity to total assets, which captures the impact of 
capitalization on bank performance.  Efthyvoulou and Yildirim (2014) state that for well-
capitalized banks, the excessive risks impact would be less profound. Thus, these banks can take 
advantage of highly profitable investment opportunities and achieve better performance and 
lower costs. 
• Bank size is measured by total assets (log of total assets). This variable captures the probable cost 
advantages that are related to size (economies of scale) (de Guevara et al., 2005).  
• Operational inefficiency is proxied by non-interest expenses to total revenue. 
• Diversification is measured by the share of non-interest sources of income in total revenue. This 
captures the impact of diversification on bank performance.  
• Customer deposits are measured by total customer deposits to total assets. This captures the 
percentage of customer deposits versus non-deposit funding. 
• The non-performing loans to total loans ratio is a measure of asset quality and its impact on bank 
performance. 
3.2.2 Macroeconomic Variables 
• GDP growth rate and inflation are included because Angelini and Cetorelli (2003) suggest that 
business cycle dynamics and a bank’s response to them may impact market power.  
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Table 1: Variable Definitions 
Variables Definition 
TC Total costs 
y  Total assets 
W(1) Price of labor (the ratio of personal expenses to total assets) 
W(2) Price of physical capital  (the ratio of other non-interest expenses to total 
assets) 
W(3) Price of the borrowed funds (the ratio of paid interests to all funding) 
Country(i) Dummy variable for the country i 
Total costs Sum of personnel expenses, other non-interest expenses, and paid 
interests 
capitalization Measured by total equity to total assets 
Bank size Measured by total assets (log of total assets). 
Operational 
inefficiency 
Proxied by non-interest expenses to total revenue 
Diversification Measured by share of non-interest sources of income in total revenue. 
Customer’s deposits measured by total customer deposits to total assets 
Asset quality Proxied by non-performing loans to total loans  
GDP growth  
Inflation  
NIM  net interest margin 
TETA risk exposure  
NEATA reserve requirement  
Fee proxy implicit interest expense  
Legal right index Index measuring legal rights protection 
Credit information 
index Index measuring credit information 
RL  rate set on loans 
RD  rate set on deposits 
r  expected risk-free interest rate, 
a and b fees that the bank charges for providing immediacy  
s  a+b 
α/β measures the monopoly rent element in bank margins 
R bank management's coefficient of absolute risk aversion 
Q the size of bank transactions 
2  the volatility of the interest rate 
Xji  vector of control variables: fee proxy, NEATA and TETA 
ui  the residual 
θo reflects the impact of market structure on the pure spread 
θ1 sensitivity of the pure spread to interest-rate volatility 
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3.3. Net Interest Margin 
As for interest rate margin, we modify the paper of Saunders and Schumacher (2000) to include 
additional factors such as the legal rights index and credit information index. The literature shows that 
legal rights protection affects loan spreads. Bae and Goyal (2004) argue that property rights protection 
impacts the lender’s ability to reconstruct. “Loan reconstructing occurs when material deviations in the 
borrower’s credit quality have occurred subsequent to initial contracting. Banks typically respond to 
declining credit quality by raising interest rates, demanding more collateral, shortening loan maturity, and 
further restricting future activities.” 
We follow Saunders and Schumacher (2000) and apply the two-step regression in studying the 
determinants of NIM: in the first step, we control for imperfections, such as implicit interest expense (fee 
proxy), reserve requirement (NEATA), and credit risk exposure (TETA) described in the model, and then 
we find the common pure spread for all banks. In the second step, we modify the model to include two 
additional variables: legal rights and credit information indices. Then, we run a second regression to 
analyze the relationship between the common pure spread as a dependent variable and the competitive 
structure of banking markets, interest-rate volatility, legal rights, and credit information indices as the 
independent variables. Saunders and Schumacher (2000) argue that such a study produces “potentially 
valuable public insights. For example, if a significant proportion of bank margins in each country is 
determined by interest rate volatility rather than monopolistic behavior by banks, then public policy 
attention might be better focused on government’s macroeconomic policies as a tool for reducing the cost 
of intermediation services”. 
We write the essential parts of the Saunders and Schumacher (2000) paper below and include the 
modifications. The paper outlines the Ho and Saunders model and derives the empirical specification. A 
more detailed description of the model and the empirical specification can be found in the Saunders and 
Schumacher’s paper (2000). The model considers the bank a risk-averse agent that acts as a dealer in a 
market that provides deposits and loans.  
 14 
 
The dealership model was proposed by Ho and Saunders (1981) and developed further by Allen 
(1988) [1] and Angbazo (1997). 
The rates are: 
𝑅𝐿 = (𝑟 + 𝑏), 𝑅𝐷 = (𝑟 − 𝑎) … … … … … … … … … … … … … … . (3) 
𝑅𝐿 − 𝑅𝐷=(a+b)………………………………………                   (4) 
RL is the rate set on loans,  
RD is the rate set on deposits, 
r is the expected risk-free interest rate,  
and a and b are fees that the bank charges for providing immediacy and bearing interest rate risk. 
The spread s= (a+b) is: 
𝑆 = (𝑎 + 𝑏) =
∝
𝛽
+
1
2
𝑅𝜎2𝑄 … … … … … … … … … . . (5) 
The first term α/β measures the monopoly rent element in bank margins. The second term 
depends on three factors: R, the bank management's coefficient of absolute risk aversion; Q, the size of 
bank transactions; and
2 , the volatility of the interest rate. Bank margins are larger when the degree of 
risk aversion is larger, the size of transactions is greater, and the volatility of interest rates is larger. 
To study the determinants of NIM, we use two steps. In the first step, imperfections such as 
implicit interest expense (fee proxy), reserve requirement (NEATA), and credit risk exposure (TETA) are 
controlled for, and the common pure spread for all banks is found. 
For the first step (first stage regression), we run the following regression:  
)6........(..........ijiji uXNIM  
 
  
NIMi is the net interest margin of bank i in some period t, and Xji is a vector of control variables 
(fee proxy, NEATA, and TETA). For each bank i in time period t, ui is the residual and γ is the regression 
constant, i.e. the estimate of the pure spread component of the NIM for all i banks at time t. 
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NIM=f{s (α/β, R, Q, σ), fee proxy, NEATA, TETA, u}……………………………..(7)                                                                          
As a result, banks that have the same attitudes to risk (R) and the same size of transactions (Q) 
and face the same market structure (α/β) and interest-rate volatility (σ2I) will have the same pure spread 
(s) (i.e. s1=s2= … sn ). Nonetheless, this pure spread will change over time, as market structure and 
interest rate volatility change. In the second step, we run a second regression to analyze the relationship 
between the common pure spread and the competitive structure of banking markets, interest-rate 
volatility, legal rights, and credit information in these markets: 
𝛾𝑡 = 𝜃0 + 𝜃1𝜎 + 𝜃2𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙. 𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡. 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 + 𝜃3𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡. 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛. 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 … … … … … . . (8) 
Where γt is a time series of pure spreads (t= 1 to 14). These values can be found from the 
intercepts of the regressions in step 1 above. θo reflects the impact of market structure on the pure spread 
and θ1 is the sensitivity of the pure spread to interest-rate volatility. θ2 and θ3 are the coefficients for the 
legal right index and the credit information index, respectively.  
4.  DATA AND RESULTS ANALYSIS 
First, we start with the market power model (equations 1 and 2). The sample consists of an 
unbalanced panel of annual report data from 2003 to 2015 for a set of banks in 12 MENA countries, 
including six Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC): United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, 
and Saudi Arabia, and six non-Gulf Cooperation Countries (non-GCC): Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria. The data is selected to cover the two sub-periods: pre- and post-Global 
Financial Crisis. The bank data comes from Bankscope. The data on GDP and inflation are from the 
World Bank. 
4.1 The Evolution of Market Power
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Table 2: Summary Statistics  
This table shows the average output price, the marginal cost, and Lerner index for the GCC and non-GCC MENA countries for the period 2003-2015. 
Country Variable 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Bahrain  
Price 0.033 0.035 0.047 0.057 0.069 0.067 0.058 0.055 0.059 0.058 0.053 0.054 0.055 
MC 0.024 0.025 0.031 0.040 0.049 0.042 0.037 0.033 0.032 0.032 0.030 0.032 0.031 
Lerner index 0.298 0.347 0.347 0.289 0.250 0.330 0.333 0.351 0.377 0.383 0.380 0.378 0.411 
Kuwait 
Price 0.041 0.053 0.062 0.070 0.068 0.069 0.053 0.047 0.044 0.041 0.038 0.035 0.036 
MC 0.026 0.028 0.032 0.042 0.047 0.047 0.032 0.027 0.024 0.022 0.020 0.019 0.021 
Lerner index 0.368 0.458 0.475 0.394 0.315 0.318 0.407 0.436 0.464 0.462 0.470 0.454 0.439 
Oman 
Price 0.070 0.068 0.070 0.069 0.059 0.054 0.059 0.055 0.047 0.045 0.044 0.040 0.039 
MC 0.046 0.041 0.042 0.042 0.040 0.036 0.038 0.035 0.031 0.030 0.031 0.029 0.027 
Lerner index 0.345 0.391 0.40 0.395 0.264 0.319 0.364 0.367 0.336 0.298 0.267 0.275 0.290 
Saudi  
Arabia 
Price 0.047 0.045 0.057 0.068 0.063 0.054 0.043 0.036 0.033 0.032 0.032 0.031 0.032 
MC 0.027 0.024 0.034 0.043 0.041 0.035 0.023 0.018 0.018 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.017 
Lerner index 0.424 0.445 0.394 0.363 0.350 0.360 0.460 0.495 0.480 0.471 0.470 0.480 0.480 
Qatar 
Price 0.051 0.040 0.051 0.062 0.131 0.060 0.056 0.058 0.043 0.039 0.038 0.036 0.040 
MC 0.027 0.022 0.030 0.040 0.039 0.040 0.039 0.034 0.023 0.021 0.021 0.019 0.020 
Lerner index 0.470 0.437 0.424 0.357 0.447 0.340 0.309 0.410 0.447 0.435 0.443 0.474 0.479 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Price 0.052 0.053 0.067 0.072 0.065 0.063 0.075 0.070 0.068 0.073 0.053 0.051 0.051 
MC 0.028 0.029 0.064 0.044 0.041 0.038 0.042 0.037 0.034 0.034 0.026 0.025 0.025 
Lerner index 0.457 0.464 0.448 0.369 0.353 0.391 0.443 0.469 0.491 0.515 0.479 0.501 0.495 
Jordan 
Price 0.052 0.047 0.058 0.073 0.077 0.078 0.068 0.062 0.060 0.061 0.063 0.062 0.058 
MC 0.041 0.037 0.042 0.050 0.055 0.053 0.047 0.039 0.040 0.039 0.042 0.043 0.041 
Lerner index 0.200 0.207 0.247 0.312 0.287 0.316 0.315 0.357 0.332 0.357 0.356 0.311 0.280 
Lebanon 
Price 0.075 0.066 0.072 0.075 0.082 0.067 0.061 0.057 0.057 0.055 0.056 0.059 0.060 
MC 0.065 0.059 0.059 0.064 0.069 0.057 0.053 0.049 0.059 0.053 0.054 0.053 0.049 
Lerner index 0.157 0.087 0.153 0.136 0.127 0.134 0.144 0.150 0.109 0.086 0.092 0.116 0.150 
Tunisia 
Price 0.065 0.063 0.065 0.070 0.072 0.072 0.062 0.058 0.057 0.055 0.062 0.067   
MC 0.054 0.053 0.054 0.053 0.053 0.051 0.045 0.043 0.044 0.045 0.096 0.054 
 
Lerner index 0.163 0.157 0.160 0.213 0.250 0.273 0.251 0.252 0.233 0.182 0.189 0.189   
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Table 2: Summary Statistics (Continued) 
Country Variable 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Morocco 
Price 0.060 0.056 0.053 0.052 0.048 0.047 0.047 0.052 0.048 0.048 0.052 0.054 0.051 
MC 0.043 0.041 0.040 0.038 0.036 0.037 0.036 0.038 0.037 0.037 0.038 0.040 0.037 
Lerner index 0.281 0.257 0.271 0.266 0.268 0.189 0.216 0.260 0.194 0.191 0.260 0.244 0.269 
Egypt 
Price       0.057 0.062 0.094 0.079 0.074 0.090 0.100 0.100 0.096 0.092 
MC 
   
0.041 0.041 0.094 0.061 0.057 0.063 0.067 0.067 0.064 0.066 
Lerner index       0.202 0.318 0.262 0.246 0.217 0.226 0.280 0.286 0.283 0.285 
Algeria 
Price 0.053 0.050 0.058 0.070 0.065 0.064 0.049 0.057 0.065 0.056 0.063 0.058   
MC 0.038 0.029 0.028 0.031 0.034 0.035 0.028 0.036 0.039 0.033 0.035 0.032 
 
Lerner index 0.292 0.401 0.529 0.515 0.483 0.459 0.325 0.387 0.340 0.270 0.426 0.526   
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Table 3: Banking System Lerner Index for GCC and Non-GCC Countries  
Countries Our results for 2003- 2015 Our results for 2008- 2015 
World Bank results 
for 2002-2008 
UAE 0.452 0.473 0.438 
S. Arabia 0.436 0.461 0.470 
Qatar  0.421 0.417 0.501 
Oman  0.332 0.314 0.399 
Kuwait 0.420 0.431 0.412 
Bahrain  0.344 0.368 0.375 
GCC Average 0.401 0.411 0.435 
Tunisia 0.210 0.224 0.211 
Morocco 0.243 0.228 0.288 
Lebanon  0.126 0.123 0.144 
Jordan  0.298 0.342 0.309 
Egypt  0.260 0.261 0.193 
 Algeria 0.413 0.390 0.473 
Non-GCC Average 0.258 0.261 0.258 
Grand Average 0.330 0.336 0.373 
Note: The table shows the evolution of the Lerner index of the banking systems for the Gulf and non-Gulf countries 
for the period 2003-2015. We find the grand average for Gulf countries as well as the grand average for non-Gulf 
countries for the period 2003-2015. The grand average for all 12 countries and all years for the same period is also 
found. The results are compared with the ones done in the World Bank study for the period 2002-2008 from 
Anzoategui, Martinez Peria, & Rocha (2010).  
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Figure 1: GCC Countries 
This figure shows the evolution of the output price, the marginal cost and the Lerner index of the banking systems for the GCC countries for the period 2003-
2015. 
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Figure 2: Non-GCC Countries 
This figure shows the evolution of the output price, the marginal cost and the Lerner index of the banking systems for the non-GCC for the period 2003-2015. 
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Tables 2 and 3 and Figures 1 and 2 show the evolution of the output price, marginal cost, and 
Lerner index of the banking systems for the Gulf and non-Gulf countries from 2003 to 2015. The tables 
display the average output price, the marginal cost, and Lerner index for each country and each year. We 
find the following: 
1. The grand average for all 12 countries and all years from 2003 to 2015 is 0.330. The figures are 
comparable to previous estimates. A World Bank study by Anzoategui et al. (2010) for the same 
12 MENA countries for the period 2002-2008 finds the average Lerner index to be 0.373. The 
average for Gulf countries for the period 2003-2015 is 0.401 while the average for non-Gulf 
countries is 0.258. The World Bank's estimation for the period 2002-2008 for the two regions is 
0.435 and 0.258 respectively (Table 3). 
2.  The evolution of competitive conditions varies between countries and over time, with non-GCC 
countries exhibiting more competitive behavior than GCC countries. The Global Financial Crisis 
impacted all 12 countries differently. When we split the sample into two sub-periods, pre-crisis 
(2003-2007) and post-crisis (2008-2015), we find that the average Lerner index increases 
following the financial crisis. For the GCC countries, the Lerner index increases from 0.378 to 
0.411 and for the non-GCC countries from 0.257 to 0.261.  
3. Although the Lerner index increases for both regions following the crisis, Figures 1 and 2 show 
that over time and between countries there is an absence of a common trend for the Lerner index. 
The absence of a common trend suggests as Efthyvoulou and Yildirim (2014) put it, that 
“countries experience the crisis differently and underline the importance of controlling for a 
broad range of country characteristics when examining the determinants of market power at the 
bank-level.”  
4. Anzoategui et al. (2010) compare the Lerner index across various regions around the world and 
find that it is higher for MENA countries. We compare our results for MENA countries with the 
results for Central and Eastern European countries found in Efthyvoulou and Yildirim (2014). 
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Interestingly, we find that most countries in Eastern Europe with weak legal systems and poor 
credit information have Lerner indices comparable to those in MENA countries. For instance, the 
Lerner index in Belarus and Moldova from 2002 to 2010 is .276 and .259 respectively. Eastern 
European countries with a strong legal system and better rule of law exhibit more competitive 
behavior; the Lerner index in Poland and the Czech Republic for the same period is .118 and .159 
respectively. Our findings support the World Bank’s suggestions that for MENA countries to 
have a more competitive banking system, policymakers should promote a stronger legal 
environment and the rule of law. 
4.2 The Determinants of Market Power 
Table 4: The Determinants of Market Power 
Dependent variable: 
Lerner index For all years 
Before the crisis 2003-
2007 
During and post-crisis 
2008-2015 
Independent variables Coefficient and p-value 
Inefficiency -0.3674 ***                   -0.2777*** -0.4201*** 
 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Capitalization 0.0192 *** 0.0172*** 0.0204*** 
 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Bank size .0311*** .0109*** .0404*** 
 
[ 0.00] [0.01] [0.00] 
Diversification 0.0800*** 0.0827*** 0.0741** 
 
[0.00] [0.01] [0.03] 
Customer deposits -0.0323 -0.0410 -0.0270 
 
[0.21] [0.32] [0.42] 
Non-performing loans to 
total loans 
-.0008*** -.0013*** -.0009* 
 
[0.00] [0.01] [0.07] 
GDP growth         -.0002 -.0011 .0011 
 
[0.82] [0.44] [0.33] 
Inflation -.0004 .0008 -.0004 
 
[0.27] [0.32] [0.30] 
Note: First, we estimate the bank-level variables and the macroeconomic variables impacting the market power 
for the full sample (2003-2015). Then, to analyze the impact of the Global Financial Crisis on market power, we 
split the sample into two sub-periods: the pre-crisis and the post-crisis years. *, **, and *** denote coefficients at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence level. 
Table 4, column 2, shows the result of the estimation of equation (2) for the full sample period of 
2003 to 2015. Starting with the bank-specific control variables, the coefficient on “bank size” is positive 
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and statistically significant at the 1% confidence level. This finding is consistent with de Guevara and 
Maudos (2007) who find that bank size impacts market power. As for “asset quality” proxied by non-
performing loans to total loans, we find that it has a negative and statistically significant impact on 
margins. The larger the percentage of non-performing loans, the smaller the profit. The estimated 
coefficient on “diversification” is positive and highly statistically significant. The coefficient on 
“inefficiency” is negative and highly statistically significant. This finding supports the efficient structure 
hypothesis, which states that firms with inefficient management have higher costs and earn lower profits. 
We find that the coefficient on “customer deposits,” which captures the percentage of customer deposit 
versus non-deposit funding, is negative but not statistically significant. For “capitalization," our findings 
indicate that well-capitalized banks enjoy higher margins. The coefficient on this variable is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% confidence level. The results are consistent with Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Huizinga (1999) and Garza-Garcia (2012). With respect to the macroeconomic variables that capture the 
impact of the business cycle on market power, the coefficients are negative, but the results are not 
statistically significant. 
4.3 The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Market Power in MENA Countries 
To analyze the impact of the Global Financial Crisis on market power, we split the full sample 
into two sub-periods: pre-crisis and post–crisis (Table 4). 
Several interesting findings emerge from the comparison of the two sub-periods: 
1. The impact of bank size on market power increases dramatically from 0.0109 pre-crisis to 0.0404 
post-crisis. The results are highly statistically significant. This is consistent with de Guevara et 
al. (2005), who demonstrate that larger banks enjoy cost advantages. Therefore, larger banks are 
better equipped to weather a crisis than small banks.  
2. The impact of diversification on market power decreases during the crisis from 0.0827 to 0.0741. 
Both results are highly statistically significant. The involvement of banks in activities that 
generate fees, trading revenue, and other non-interest income negatively impacts market power 
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during the crisis. This is in line with Stiroh and Rumble (2006) who show that the gains from 
diversification are offset by exposure to risky activities. 
3. The impact of non-performing loans to total asset on market power slightly increases from -
0.0013 to -0.0009. This result is statistically significant. 
4. The impact of capitalization on market power increases from 0.0172 to 0.0204. This means that 
banks with higher capitalization can better weather the crisis. This is consistent with Efthyvoulou 
and Yildirim (2014) who state that well-capitalized banks are impacted less profoundly by 
excessive risks. Thus, these banks can engage in highly profitable investment opportunities, 
reduce costs, and attain superior performance. 
4.4 Factors Impacting Interest Rate Margin 
Next, we examine the net interest margin (NIM) (Equations 3-8). The source of our data is the 
income statement and balance sheet information extracted from the Bankscope Data Base (2016) covering 
the period 2003–2015. The sample period selection is important because it covers the Global Financial 
Crisis and the efforts of central banks around the world to impose stricter supervisory and regulatory 
measures to ensure the safety and stability of the global financial system. Among the multiple measures 
imposed, banks had to increase their capital ratio to create a sufficient buffer to withstand future periods 
of severe economic and financial distress. In our study, we examine the impact of the capital ratio 
increase on the profitability of banks in the MENA region.   
The main contribution of our study is including the legal rights and credit information indices as 
factors impacting NIM. Data for the indicator of legal rights and the depth of credit information are taken 
from the World Bank website. The indicator of legal rights has a scale from 1 through 12. A score of 12 
indicates that legal rights are mostly protected. For the depth of credit information, the scale is from 1 
through 8, where a score of 8 indicates that the credit information is completely available. Data on interest 
rate volatility is taken from the central banks of the countries involved. Twelve Middle Eastern and North 
African countries (MENA) were selected, namely six Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC): United Arab 
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Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, and six non-Gulf countries (Non-GCC): 
Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria.  
Table 5: OLS Regression for All the Country’s Banks and All the Years 
Independent variables Coefficient and p-value 
TETA 0.06*** 
 [0.00] 
NEATA 0.31*** 
 [0.00] 
Fee Proxy 9.15*** 
 [0.00] 
Intercept 2.45*** 
 [0.000] 
Note: The dependent variable is the interest rate margin. The independent variables are Fee Proxy, which is 
Implicit interest rate = (Non-interest expense – non-interest revenue)/ total earning assets; NEATA, which is 
non-interest earning assets to total assets; and TETA: total equity to total assets. *, **, and *** denote 
coefficients at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence level. 
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Table 6: OLS for GCC Countries 
Dependent variable: Interest rate margin. Independent variables:  Fee Proxy: Implicit interest rate = (Non-interest expense – non-interest revenue)/ total earning 
assets. NEATA: Non-interest earning assets to total assets. TETA: total equity to total assets. The letter a, b, and c indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
  
Country Variable  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Bahrain 
TETA 0.004 -0.001c 0.009 0.008 0.015 0.007 0.009 0.0163b 0.02c 0.0182b 0.03c 0.04c 0.02c 
NEATA 1.00 0.726c 2.001c 2.412c 2.765c 2.183c 2.643c -0.09 2.227c 2.212c 2.293c 1.11 0.83 
Fee Proxy 1.047 -1.140 0.898 1.629 2.581 1.719 1.541 -0.268 3.073 3.081 5.328b 3.260 2.233 
Intercept 2.497c 2.594c 2.413c 2.371c 2.183c 2.465c 2.292c 2.583c 2.175c 2.306c 2.166c 2.269c 2.233c 
Kuwait 
TETA 0.075c -0.003 0.084c 0.042c 0.067c 0.053c 0.033c 0.060c 0.087c 0.075c 0.087c 0.108c 0.076c 
NEATA 1.525c 0.804c 2.497c 3.114c 3.030c 3.484c 5.102c -0.082 3.439c 2.197c 1.756c 1.555b 0.752 
Fee Proxy 41.896c -2.55 24.976c 20.889c 37.715c 35.303c -13.657c -8.846c 48.519c 18.020c 39.288c 61.548c 66.560c 
Intercept 1.782c 2.903c 1.700c 2.082c 1.743c 1.923c 1.997c 2.433c 1.421c 1.863c 1.761c 1.483c 1.965c 
Oman 
TETA 0.086c 0.003 0.089c 0.044c 0.069c 0.058c 0.035c 0.061c 0.091c 0.076c 0.088c 0.109c 0.078c 
NEATA 1.353c 0.572b 2.308c 2.921c 2.803c 3.093c 4.467c -0.099a 3.173c 2.073c 1.637c 1.400b 0.628 
Fee Proxy 47.868c -0.026 26.664c 21.859c 39.248c 40.120c -11.412a -9.087c 53.860c 19.359c 41.224c 69.609c 76.120c 
Intercept 1.711c 3.058c 1.802c 2.227c 1.838c 2.001c 2.307c 2.631c 1.430c 2.004c 1.847c 1.449c 1.894c 
United 
Arab 
Emirate
s 
TETA 0.181c 0.121c 0.179c 0.139c 0.134c 0.154c 0.131c 0.133c 0.148c 0.162c 0.129c 0.135c 0.123c 
NEATA 0.707 -1.152c 1.817c 1.882c 1.626b 0.994 1.968b -0.067 0.953 1.391c 1.157c 0.505 -0.001 
Fee Proxy 77.017c 21.157c 54.058c 40.560c 56.277c 73.073c 27.083c -3.662 75.656c 50.695c 50.543c 75.455c 86.217c 
Intercept 0.793c 2.044c 0.757c 1.334c 1.385c 1.164c 1.351c 1.709c 1.178c 0.958c 1.509c 1.457c 1.690c 
Qatar 
TETA 0.036c 0.008 0.046c 0.032c 0.061c 0.032c 0.034c 0.009c 0.062c 0.053c 0.063c 0.074c 0.074c 
NEATA 1.401c 0.648c 2.555c 3.228c 3.171c 3.904c 5.358c -0.082  4.105c 2.329c 1.926c 1.965c 1.965c 
Fee Proxy 37.180c -0.599 17.376c 20.376c 36.870c 30.693c -12.545b -8.481c 38.737c 15.037c 37.103c 53.591c 53.591c 
Intercept 2.161c 2.788c 2.127c 2.190c 1.753c 2.123c 2.000c 2.548c 1.612c 2.095c 1.975c 1.783c 1.783c 
 Saudi 
Arabia 
TETA 0.067c -0.007 0.077c 0.037c 0.064c 0.047c 0.028c 0.056c 0.084c 0.070c 0.084c 0.105c 0.073c 
NEATA 1.451c 0.812c 2.511c 3.163c 3.020c 3.663c 5.369c -0.084 3.516c 2.209c 1.760c 1.533c 0.702 
Fee Proxy 41.652c -2.490 23.569c 20.949c 37.499c 33.936c -14.599c -8.780c 47.751c 17.359c 39.365c 63.055c 68.609c 
Intercept 1.883c 2.973c 1.820c 2.174c 1.806c 2.015c 2.123c 2.494c 1.494c 1.956c 1.818c 1.515c 1.985c 
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Table 7: OLS for non-GCC Countries 
Dependent variable: Interest rate margin. Independent variables:  Fee Proxy: Implicit interest rate = (Non-interest expense – non-interest revenue)/ total earning assets. 
NEATA: Non-interest earning assets to total assets. TETA: total equity to total assets. The letters a, b, and c indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  
Country Variable  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Algeria 
TETA 0.025c 0.020b 0.022b 0.030c 0.032c 0.023b 0.020b 0.050c 0.034c 0.031c 0.039c 0.047c 0.034c 
NEATA 2.140c 1.875c 1.553c 1.672c 1.400c 2.218c 2.524c 0.149 1.923c 2.110c 1.880c 1.782c 1.845c 
Fee 
Proxy -16.703c -11.997c -5.000  -7.462b -2.459 -18.496c -23.312c -3.633 -13.101c -17.098c -12.727c -14.242c -15.390c 
Intercept 3.099c 3.135c 3.253c 3.100c 3.101c 3.112c 3.047c 3.274c 3.042c 3.105c 3.082c 3.001c 3.143c 
Egypt 
TETA 0.094c 0.052c 0.108c 0.074c 0.082c 0.084c 0.070c 0.087c 0.093c 0.091c 0.094c 0.109c 0.087c 
NEATA 1.422c -0.208  2.300c 2.646c 2.795c 2.775c 3.364c -0.070 2.776c 2.008c 1.660c 1.611c 0.876b 
Fee 
Proxy 47.486c 10.928c 33.323c 29.473c 43.864c 49.161c 17.084c -5.007c 52.861c 32.343c 44.738c 53.141c 56.196c 
Intercept 1.682c 2.548c 1.567c 1.887c 1.677c 1.656c 1.837c 2.212c 1.498c 1.670c 1.651c 1.459c 1.734c 
Jordan 
TETA 0.076c 0.008 0.070c 0.040c 0.066c 0.052c 0.031c 0.054c 0.085c 0.067c 0.081c 0.100c 0.072c 
NEATA 0.998c 0.564c 1.617c 1.953c 1.769c 1.552c 2.205c -0.081 1.531c 1.795c 1.426c 0.917b 0.805a 
Fee 
Proxy 44.959c 0.394 24.338c 21.356c 36.052c 34.179c -5.577 -8.278c 48.130c 20.471c 39.733c 54.289c 56.641c 
Intercept 1.997c 3.225c 2.204c 2.491c 2.096c 2.366c 2.717c 2.865c 1.801c 2.196c 1.996c 1.760c 2.123c 
 Lebanon 
TETA 0.050c 0.034c 0.054c 0.049c 0.051c 0.052c 0.049c 0.052c 0.060c 0.058c 0.070c 0.076c 0.065c 
NEATA 2.116c 1.505c 2.366c 2.303c 2.123c 2.213c 2.541c 0.239c 2.202c 2.309c 2.058c 2.011c 1.880c 
Fee 
Proxy 26.186c -3.823 17.188c 19.510c 25.253c 22.607c 7.845b -0.663  23.437c 16.254c 26.007c 27.003c 27.647c 
Intercept 1.543c 2.153c 1.601c 1.632c 1.609c 1.622c 1.666c 2.340c 1.531c 1.600c 1.482c 1.436c 1.547c 
Morocco 
TETA 0.097c 0.014 0.106c 0.053c 0.081c 0.078c 0.036c 0.051c 0.105c 0.089c 0.094c 0.115c 0.089c 
NEATA -0.080a -0.121b -0.05 -0.07 -0.06 -0.08 -0.10 -0.103b -0.07 0.00 -0.03 -0.07 -0.08 
Fee 
Proxy 64.691c 9.699c 36.250c 27.753c 41.270c 59.221c 12.071b -6.412c 68.681c 42.758c 62.802c 82.919c 85.009c 
Intercept 1.839c 3.082c 2.103c 2.629c 2.243c 2.163c 2.890c 2.905c 1.739c 2.142c 1.957c 1.607c 1.858c 
Tunisia 
TETA 0.079c -0.005 0.086c 0.041c 0.067c 0.053c 0.042c 0.060c 0.089c 0.074c 0.087c 0.109c 0.079c 
NEATA 1.556c 0.805c 2.475c 3.197c 3.152c 3.828c 3.632c -0.090 3.772c 2.198c 1.732c 1.592b 0.675 
Fee 
Proxy 47.320c -2.522 25.479c 20.999c 38.772c 37.849c -2.072 -9.163c 52.778c 17.892c 40.622c 73.140c 80.661c 
Intercept 1.662c 2.948c 1.742c 2.479c 1.705c 1.876c 2.163c 2.538c 1.288c 1.905c 1.775c 1.367c 1.833c 
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The bank capital ratios factor (TETA) in Table 5 is highly statistically significant and has the 
expected positive sign, which indicates that the higher the required capital ratio, the lower the bank’s 
profitability. To compensate for the cost of holding a higher capital ratio, banks seek to increase their 
NIM. This result is consistent across all countries (Tables 6 and 7) and is predominantly statistically 
significant. The implicit interest rate (fee proxy) has a strong and positive impact on NIM. The variable is 
highly statistically significant, and this result supports the previous literature. Saunders and Schumacher 
(2000) explain that the restriction on paying explicit interest on deposits appears to be met by positive 
implicit payments (or subsidies to depositors instead). However, to finance these payments, banks must 
increase their loans rates and thus their actual NIM. The results are consistent across all countries (Tables 
6 and 7) and are above all statistically significant. The reserve requirements variable in Table 5 has the 
positive expected sign, and the results are statistically significant.  
In the second step, we run a panel regression to analyze the relationship between the common 
pure margin and the competitive structure of banking markets, interest rate volatility, and the legal rights 
and credit information indices in these markets.  
Figure 3: Volatility of Interest Rates in the GCC MENA Countries 
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Figure 4: Volatility of Interest Rates in the Non-GCC MENA Countries 
 
 
 
 
Figures 3 and 4 show the volatility of interest rates for the GCC and non-GCC MENA countries. 
The data for interest rates is collected from the central banks of the selected countries. To compute the 
volatility of interest rates for each country and each year, we find the standard deviation of the monthly 
rates.  
In the second step regression, we use the intercepts (the pure spread) estimated from the country-
specific cross-sectional regression (Tables 6 and 7) as the dependent variables.  
Table 8: Second Step Regression.  
Independent variables                         Coefficient and p-value 
Intercept                                                                       2.70*** 
                                                                                        [0.00]
Volatility                                                                      -.65*** 
                                                                                       [0.00]
Legal right index                                                         -.11*** 
                                                                                       [0.04]
Credit information index                                         -.08*** 
     [0.00]                                                                       
Note: The dependent variable is the pure interest margin, which is the intercepts taken from the cross-sectional 
regressions in Tables 5 and 6. The independent variables are interest rate volatility, Legal right index, and 
credit information index. *, **, and *** denote coefficients at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence level. 
 
 
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
V
O
LA
TI
LI
TY
 O
F 
IN
ER
ES
 R
A
TE
S
V O L A T I L I T Y  O F  I N T E R E S T  R A T E S  I N  T H E  N O N - G C C  M E N A  C O U N T R I E S
Egypt Jordan Morocco Lebanon Tunisia Algeria
 30 
 
Table 8 shows the results of the second-step regression. The table shows that volatility of interest 
rates has a negative impact on interest rate margins and the results are statistically significant, thus the 
higher the volatility, the lower the margin. Also, the table shows that the legal rights and credit 
information indices are highly statistically significant and have the expected negative signs. The more 
protected the legal rights and the more complete the credit information in a country, the more efficient the 
banking system and the lower the NIM. This result has major policy implications: MENA countries must 
improve their legal rights environment to improve the efficiency of their financial systems. This finding 
supports the results we obtain in the first model (the market power model). 
We find that the banking markets in the selected MENA countries explain, on average, 2.52% of 
the pure spread. The variable is highly statistically significant. Overall, the results indicate that the 
banking markets in the selected MENA countries are less efficient than the markets in developed 
countries. Saunders and Schumacher (2000) find that the banking markets in six selected European 
countries and the U.S. are quite efficient, with the intercept variable suggesting that only approximately 
0.20% of margins, on average, can be explained by market structure. The implication of these results is 
that MENA countries should improve their market structure to be more competitive. 
5.  CONCLUSION 
This paper provides an up-to-date assessment of the evolution of competitive conditions in 12 
Middle Eastern and North African countries (MENA) in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, 
namely six Gulf countries (GCC): United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, and Saudi 
Arabia, and six non-Gulf countries (non-GCC): Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria. 
We find that the evolution of market power varies between countries and over time, with non-GCC 
countries exhibiting more competitive behavior than GCC countries. The total average of the Lerner 
index for all 12 countries and all years during the period 2003-2015 is 0.330. Taken separately, the total 
average for GCC countries is 0.401 while the average for non-GCC countries is 0.258. The World Bank’s 
estimation for the period 2002-2008 for the two regions is 0.435 and 0.258 respectively. 
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Our results show an overall increase in market power following the financial crisis in both 
regions. We find that bank size, asset quality, diversification, inefficiency, and capitalization have 
statistically significant effects on market power. In analyzing the impact of the financial crisis, we find 
that bank size, capitalization, and diversification affect market power differently in the pre-crisis and post-
crisis years; larger banks enjoy cost advantages, and diversification negatively impacts market power 
during the crisis and in the post-crisis years. The impact of capitalization on market power has increased. 
Banks with higher capitalization can better weather the crisis. 
Analyzing the net interest margin (NIM), the major contribution of this research is to augment the 
Saunders and Schumacher (2000) model to include the legal rights indicator and credit information index 
as factors impacting NIM. We find that the legal rights index is highly statistically significant and has the 
expected negative sign. The more protected the legal rights in a country, the more efficient the banking 
system and the lower the net interest margin. This finding is consistent with the previous literature. This 
result has major policy implications: MENA countries need to improve the legal rights environment to 
improve the efficiency of their financial system.  
We find that the bank capital ratios factor (TETA) is highly statistically significant and has the 
expected positive sign. The higher the required capital ratio, the lower the bank’s profitability. To 
compensate for the cost of holding a higher capital ratio, banks seek to increase their NIM. The implicit 
interest rate (fee proxy) has a strong and positive impact on NIM. The variable is highly statistically 
significant. This result is in line with the previous literature. The reserve requirements variable has the 
expected positive sign, and the results are statistically significant.  
In analyzing the competitive structure of banking markets, we find that the banking markets in the 
selected MENA countries explain, on average, 2.87% of the pure spread. The findings indicate that the 
banking markets in the selected MENA countries are less efficient than the markets in developed 
countries. The implication of these results is that MENA countries should improve their market structure 
to become more competitive with developed countries. We conclude that policymakers in MENA 
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countries should show a sustained commitment to promoting the rule of law, a stronger legal 
environment, deeper financial reforms, and a more competitive environment in the banking system.    
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Chapter 2 
The Impact of Firm-Level Characteristic and County-Specific Attributes on the Performance and 
Efficiency of the Microfinance Institutions 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
The World Bank estimates that 10.7 percent of the world’s population lives on less than US$1.90 
per day (World Bank, n.d.). Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) provide financial services to the populations 
poor, who are excluded from the traditional financial system. The services include collateral-free 
microcredit, savings, and insurance accounts. MFIs face major challenges in their way to financial 
inclusions; information asymmetry, financial sustainability, and outreach are some of the problems. A 
steady flow of literature covers these issues. With regard to information asymmetry, Attanasio, Augsburg, 
de Haas, Fitzsimons, and Harmgart (2015) find that borrowers with joint liability reduce agency problems 
by screening and monitoring each other. Gine, Goldberg, and Yang (2012) study how improvements in a 
lender's ability to determine borrowers’ identities would impact the credit market. Lenders can decrease 
information asymmetry by penalizing past defaulters and rewarding good borrowers by withholding or 
expanding future loans. Recent studies center on financial sustainability. Unlike traditional financial 
institutions that have the goal of profit maximization, MFIs have social goals in addition to their financial 
objectives. There is a debate in the literature whether the future of microfinance lies in the for-profit vs. 
non-profit MFIs. Proponents of the for-profits MFIs argue that outreach to poor families cannot be 
expanded without the commercial transformation of MFIs. Conning and Morduch (2011) argue that the 
future of MFIs rests in combining the philanthropic and commercial forces. They propose a more rigorous 
“corporate finance of microfinance.” A large body of literature emphasizes MFIs’ outreach. Hermes, 
Lensink, and Meesters (2011) investigate the trade-off between outreach to the poor and efficiency of 
microfinance institutions. They find that outreach and efficiency are negatively correlated. 
This study identifies and analyzes the impact of firm specific attributes and country 
characteristics on MFIs’ performance. Our results have numerous policy implications. 
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This paper adds to the literature in the following ways:  
First, it provides an up-to-date assessment of the performance and the efficiency of MFIs. 
Second, a very large dataset of over 10,000 firm-years is used that cover MFIs in six major 
geographical regions in 89 countries. Thus, we can conduct a comparative analysis of the MFIs’ 
performances in different sociocultural environments.  
Third, our dataset for the period 2008-2015 covers the aftermath of the global financial crisis 
(GFC). The (GFC) has had a dramatic impact on countries around the world and drastically affected the 
financial institutions’ activities, including the MFIs’ performance. Imai, Gaiha, Thapa, Annim, & Gupta 
(2011) find that “under the continuous effect of the global financial crisis, the donor’s investment in 
microfinance sector has shrunk”. Chen, Rasmussen, and Reille (2010) reported that several countries have 
experienced a microfinance repayment crisis. And the global economic recession “was among the various 
contextual factors affecting borrowers’ repayment capacity”. 
Fourth, we identify as country-specific variables (country GDP size and GDP growth, and 
inflation) as well as firm-specific features (MFI diamond rating of information self-disclosure, regulation 
status, firm maturity, asset size, number of offices, percent of women borrower, and percent of female 
board members) and we examine their impact on a set of performance measures such as outreach, 
efficiency, and profitability. 
A literature review follows this introductory section. We review the academic literature to 
examine the challenges facing MFIs and the effectiveness of different microfinance techniques. 
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Group Lending vs. Individual Lending 
Cassar and Wydick (2010) study group lending in five countries: India, Kenya, Guatemala, 
Armenia, and the Philippines finding that “societal trust positively and significantly influences group 
contribution rates”, and “that peer monitoring can have perverse as well as beneficial effects”. 
Feigenberg, Field, and Pande (2011) examine group lending by assigning microfinance clients to various 
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repayment groups. They find that groups that meet more frequently “exhibit a higher willingness to pool 
risk with group members” and “they were also three times less likely to default on their second loan”. 
Gine, Krishnaswamy, and Ponce (2013) study the possibility of default in group lending and find that 
“Exposure to common shocks and strategic default are reasons for the deterioration in group repayment”. 
Gine, Jakiela, Karlan, and Morduch (2010) study the free-riding dilemma in group lending. They find that 
“Group contracts benefit borrowers by creating implicit insurance against investment losses, but the costs 
are borne by other borrowers, especially the most risk averse”. Some studies examine the behavioral 
aspect of microcredit. The literature shows that high-frequency payment is important to avoid loan 
delinquencies. Bauer, Chytilova, and Morduch (2012) draw “a link between self-control problems and the 
contractual mechanisms of microcredit”. Their survey shows that one third of participants have 
“hyperbolic preferences (more impatient now than in the future)”. The authors find that microcredit 
contracts are “helpful structure for people with self-discipline problems who seek to accumulate capital 
but who lack suitable contractual saving devices”. On the other hand, literature shows that frequent 
weekly repayment discourages the creation of new business. Field, Pande, Papp, and Rigol (2013) 
compare contracts that require that repayments start immediately after the loan vs. contract that includes a 
2-month grace period. They find that “the provision of a grace period increased short-run business 
investment and long-run profits but also default rates”. Mersland and Strøm (2009) study the determinants 
of MFIs’ outreach to poor clients. The authors find that “outreach is lower in the case of lending to 
individuals than in the case of group lending”. 
2.2 Interest Rate Elasticity of Demand 
Rhyne (2011) examines the issue of why the interest rate in microfinance is so high. She emphasizes 
the need for sustainability to ensure outreach. Dehejia, Montgomery, and Morduch (2012) examine 
whether increasing interest rate will cause microfinance institutions to lose customers. The authors find 
that “Less wealthy accountholders are more sensitive to the interest rate than (relatively) wealthier 
borrowers (an elasticity of –0.86 compared to –0.26), and consequently the bank’s portfolio shifts away 
from its poorest borrowers when it increases the interest rate”. El Gamal, El Komi, Karlan, and Osman 
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(2014) propose an alternative way to expand microfinance. Since in Islamic religion, interest rate is 
prohibited, there are no interest rate payments in their model. The authors aim to “establish credit unions 
for the poor in which the bank plays the role of a guarantor in the familiar rotating savings and credit 
association (RoSCA)”. The authors test the model in laboratory experiments in the field and find that their 
“bank-insured RoSCA model generated significantly higher takeup and repayment rates than the Grameen 
model”. 
2.3 Saving and Micro-Insurance Products 
Beck (2015) names several barriers discouraging access to formal saving for low-income 
households, namely: “(i) geography, (ii) transaction cost, (iii) documentation requirements, (iv) 
behavioral constraints, and (v) lack of financial literacy”. Burgess and Pande (2005) study the issue of 
whether government expansion of saving facilities can have an impact on poverty. They find that “branch 
expansion into rural unbanked locations in India significantly reduced rural poverty”. Ashraf, Karlan, and 
Yin (2006) find that deposit collection exists in many developing countries. De Mel, McIntosh, and 
Woodruff (2013) conduct a field experiment in Sri Lanka. To collect deposits, the bank installs a savings 
lockbox rather than sending the deposit collector to the village. The authors find that “substantially less 
expensive deposit collection techniques are almost as effective as Weekly Home visits at generating 
deposits for the participating bank”. Dupas, Green, Keats, and Robinson (2015) conduct an experiment in 
Western Kenya to examine whether waving the bank’s account opening fee will increase saving. They 
find that “While 63% of people opened an account, only 18% actively used it. Survey evidence suggests 
that the main reasons people did not begin saving in their bank accounts are that: (1) they do not trust the 
bank, (2) service is unreliable, and (3) withdrawal fees are prohibitively expensive”.  
Several studies examine customers’ behavioral constraints, Ashraf, Aycinena, Martínez, and 
Yang (2015) study the degree Salvadoran migrants in the United States value the opportunity to exert 
greater control over their saving in their home countries. They find that “Migrants offered the greatest 
degree of control accumulated the most savings”. Recent studies focus on the lack of financial literacy. 
Cole, Sampson, and Zia (2011) find that a financial education program has “modest effects on demand” 
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for financial services while “small subsidies greatly increase demand”. Karlan, Kutsoati, McMillan, and 
Udry (2011) examine the impact of risk mitigation on farmers’ investment decisions in Ghana. They 
propose farmers loans, in which the farmers are forgiven 50% of the loan repayment if crop prices drop 
below a certain price. They find that “loan uptake is high among all farmers and the indemnity component 
has little impact on uptake or other outcomes of interest”. In a field experiment conducted by Gaurav, 
Cole, and Tobacman (2011), 600 small-scale farmers in India were offered rainfall insurance, while 
simultaneously given financial literacy and insurance education. The authors find that “Financial 
education has a positive and significant effect on rainfall insurance adoption, increasing take-up from 8 to 
16 percent. Only one marketing intervention, the moneyback guarantee, has a consistent and large effect 
on farmers’ purchase decisions”. Islam, Nguyen, and Smyth (2015) examine whether microcredit in rural 
Bangladesh can substitute informal lenders in village economies. They find that “poorer microcredit 
members are trapped in a circle of vicious debt, in which they have to keep borrowing from informal 
sources, in order to repay microcredit loans”. 
2.4 Microfinance Sustainability 
Recent literature investigates the sustainability of microfinance. The question is whether 
microfinance can be commercially viable. Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch (2009) using a data set that 
includes 346 of the world’s leading microfinance institutions and covers nearly 18 million active 
borrowers find that microfinance institutions were very successful in term of maintaining a high level of 
loan repayment, but “profit-maximizing investors would have limited interest in most of the institutions 
that are focusing on the poorest customers and women”. Gonzalez (2007) finds that “the three main 
drivers of operating expense ratio (OER) are relative loan sizes, ages, and scale”. The author also finds 
that the cost will decrease dramatically when the microfinance firm’s size grows beyond 2000 customers. 
Cull et al. (2009) find that it is costly for microfinance institutions to comply with regulation. Menkhoff, 
Neuberger, and Rungruxsirivorn (2011) select a representative sample from Northeast Thailand. They 
find that “lenders enforce collateral-free loans through third-party guarantees and relationship lending, but 
also through modifying loan terms, such as reducing loan size”. Servin Juarez, Lensink, and van den Berg 
 43 
(2012) study the relationship between type of ownership and technical efficiency of MFIs in Latin 
America. They find that “non-governmental organizations and cooperatives have much lower interfirm 
and intrafirm technical efficiencies than non-bank financial intermediaries and banks. That indicates the 
importance of ownership type for technical efficiency”. Hartarska, Shen, and Mersland (2013) study the 
relationship between MFIs’ outreach and sustainability. Their results support “the existence of a trade-off 
between outreach and sustainability”. 
2.5 Female Empowerment 
Bellucci, Borisov, and Zazzaro (2010) find that “female entrepreneurs face tighter access to 
credit, even though they do not pay higher interest rates”. The paper also finds loan officers behave 
differently according to their gender: “female officers are more risk-averse or less self-confident than 
male officers, as they tend to restrict credit availability to new, unestablished borrowers more than their 
male counterparts”. 
Demirgüç-Kunt, Klapper, and Singer (2013) analyze the Global Financial Database that measures 
how customers in 148 economies save, borrow, make payments, and manage risk. They find that “There 
are significant disparities in account penetration along gender lines” and that “the gender gap is 
particularly large in South Asia and the Middle East and North Africa”. Aterido, Beck, and Iacovone 
(2013), studying the gender gap in Sub-Saharan Africa, find that unconditional gender gap exists, but 
when “key observable characteristics of the enterprises or individuals are taken into account, the gender 
gap disappears. Yoong, Rabinovich, and Diepeveen (2012) study the gender effects for transfer programs. 
Their results show that “Findings for micro-credit remain highly controversial and inconclusive”. Strøm, 
D’Espallier, and Mersland (2014) examine whether gender plays role in MFI performance and 
governance. They find that female managed MFI have better performance, but the performance does not 
lead to improved governance. 
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3.  DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Data 
Microfinance data is collected from the MixMarket dataset (www.mixmarket.org). This dataset 
provides self-reported information of the participating Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) across the world. 
Country GDP, GDP growth, and inflation data are collected from the World Bank Database (World Bank, 
n.d.). Our overall sample consists of over 10,000 firm-years for MFIs in 89 countries for the period 2008-
2015. Table 1 summarizes the composition of the overall sample and the six regional subsamples in terms 
of maturity, regulation, and number of countries in each sample.  
Table 1: Maturity, Regulation and Composition of Geographic Subsamples 
 
3.2 Methodology 
We follow Ashraf and Hassan (2011) in identifying the firm-specific as well as country-specific 
characteristics that explain MFIs’ performance. We expand their work by including additional 
characteristics, such as percentage of female board members, and examine the impact of the female 
empowerment attribute on the performance and outreach of MFIs. We also include variables that allow us 
to investigate the efficiency of MFIs in the six major geographical regions. We employ up-to-date data to 
conduct the work. 
In Table 1, we present the composition of MFIs sample for each of the six geographic regions as well as the overall sample.  
We also report number of countries in each region and for overall sample. 
 
 
Africa 
East 
Asia 
Eastern Europe  
& Central Asia 
Latin America  
& Caribbean 
North Africa  
& Middle East 
South Asia 
Overall  
Sample 
New 21.64% 16.74% 17.09% 6.35% 13.16% 13.15% 14.72% 
Young 20.50% 16.09% 24.43% 11.48% 17.11% 20.11% 17.84% 
Mature 57.86% 67.17% 58.49% 82.17% 69.74% 66.75% 68.08% 
Regulated 87.73% 78.76% 91.12% 44.13% 50.92% 67.49% 79.43% 
Not 
regulated 
12.27% 21.24% 8.88% 55.87% 49.08% 32.51% 20.17% 
Number of 
Countries 
24 11 16 22 10 6 89 
Sample  Period: 2008 to 2015 Annual Balance Sheet Data 
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As in Ashraf and Hassan (2011), we use regression analysis to measure the MFIs’ performances 
in three sets of measures: a) outreach, b) efficiency and c) overall financial performances by using two 
sets of explanatory variables: i) country-specific variables and ii) firm-specific variables.  
Equation (1) depicts the set of regression models that we use: 
𝑌𝑘,𝑖 = 𝑋𝑘,𝑖,0 +  ∑ 𝛾𝑘,𝑖,𝑛. 𝑋𝑘,𝑖,𝑛
𝑛=8
𝑛=1
+ 𝜀𝑘,𝑖  (1) 
Where, i  = 1, 2, … , 7; for six regions and the total sample 
n = 1, 2, … , 10; for three country specific variables and seven firm specific 
variables 
k = 1, 2, …, 8; for eight performance measures of three broad categories 
 
4.  RESULTS ANALYSIS 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
In Table 2, we report the descriptive statistics for the country-specific and firm-specific 
exogenous variables  
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Explanatory Variables 
 
Table 2 presents the summary of descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables. The first and the second row for each variable correspond to 
the mean and the standard deviation (quoted within parenthesis) respectively. 
  
Variable Name Variable Description Africa 
East 
Asia& 
Pacific 
East Europe 
& Central 
Asia 
Latin 
America & 
Caribbean 
North 
Africa & 
Middle East 
South 
East Asia All 
INFLATION World Bank report 10.002 
(17.409) 
5.4256 
(4.683) 
10.537 
(11.649) 
5.4256 
(4.683) 
7.577 
(9.919) 
7.824 
(4.270) 
7.809 
(10.509) 
LN(GDP) natural log of country GDP size 
(GDP in million) 
23.647 25.542 24.213 25.542 24.749 26.544 25.099 
 
(1.339) (1.674) (3.274) (1.674) (1.202) (1.775) (2.308) 
GDP GROWTH previous year GDP growth 5.418 3.901 5.126 3.901 4.536 6.274 5.220 
 (3.038) (3.102) (5.180) (3.102) (4.352) (2.630) (3.596) 
DIAMONDS the composite rating of MFIs 
reported in MixMarket Database 
2.803 3.647 3.117 3.647 3.280 3.151 3.211 
 (.973) (.975) (1.032) (.9759) (.9891) (1.270) (1.091) 
REGULATED dummy that is one if MFIs are 
regulated by a legal entity and zero 
otherwise 
.876 .4413 .9116 .441 .5092 .6785 0.693 
 (.329) (.496) (.283) (.496) (.5005) (.4672) (0.461) 
        
FIRM’AGE discrete variable that takes 1, 2 and 
3 if MFIs is ranked as New, Young 
or Mature 
2.380 2.758 2.424 2.758 2.565 2.535 2.547 
 (.804) (.557) (.7686) (.5572) (.7142) (.715) (0.724) 
        
LN(ASSETS) natural logarithm of MFIs asset 
size 
15.013 16.423 15.719 16.423 16.317 15.920 15.778 
 (2.194) (2.014) (2.364) (2.014) (1.594) (1.913) (2.195) 
        
NUMBER OF 
OFFICES 
number of offices 
27.687 26.363 19.684 26.363 44.567 139.727 47.991 
 (60.680) (52.765) (47.462) (52.765) (99.286) (394.927) (193.713) 
% OF FEMALE percentage of female borrower .2897 .4673 .3667 .4673 .4690 .7116 0.458 
BOOROWER (.336) (.322) (.2641) (.3222) (.3381) (.399) (0.370) 
        
% OF 
FEMALE(BOARD)  
percentage of female board member .0974 
(.196) 
.130 
.223) 
.138  
(.238) 
.130  
(.223) 
.1244  
(.201) 
.146  
(.217) 
0.129 
(0.225) 
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4.2 Outreach Measures of MFI’s 
Table 3, 4, and 5 presents the regression results for three outreach measures: a) number of 
depositors, b) number of deposit accounts, and c) number of active borrowers, respectively. We scale the 
variables: number of active borrowers and the number of deposit accounts by dividing them by 10^4, and 
the number of depositors by dividing it by 10^3. We summarize the results in terms of the impact of the 
country-specific and firm-level variables on the selected outreach measures. 
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Table 3:  Number of Depositors 
Outreach Measures of MFI's 
 
Tables 3 present the regression results for the Outreach Measure:  Number of Depositors for: a) Overall Sample and 
b) six different geographic subsamples. In each panel, the first column of regression results corresponds to the 
Overall Sample, and column 2 through column 7 report results for 1) Africa, 2) East Asia, 3) East Europe & Central 
Asia, 4) Latin America and Caribbean, 5) North Africa and Middle East and 6) South East Asia. 
 
Explanatory variables consist two types of variables: a) Country Specific Variables [Ln_GDP is the natural log of 
country GDP size and GROWTH is the GDP growth and INFLATION for inflation]; b) Firms Specific Variables 
[DIAMONDS is the composite rating of MFIs reported in MixMarket Database, REGULATED is the dummy that is 
one if MFIs are regulated by a legal entity and zero otherwise, NUMBERAGE is a discrete variable that takes 1, 2 
and 3 if MFIs is ranked as New, Young or Mature, LN_ASSET is natural logarithm of MFIs asset size, OFFICES is 
number of branches, % FEMALE  is the percentage of women borrower and % FEM.BOARD is the percentage of 
female board members. 
 
 Number of Depositors 
 All East Asia 
& the 
Pacific 
Africa East 
Europe & 
Central 
Asia 
North 
Africa& 
Middle 
East 
South 
East Asia 
Latin 
America 
&Caribbean 
C -0.807 -1.106 -14.966a 1.75 0.545 -7.919 0.215 
LN_GDP -0.909c -0.945c -0.547b -0.960c -0.963c -0.641c -0.936c 
GROWTH -0.007 -0.044 -0.015 0.000 -0.027 0.080 0.017 
INFLATION 0.108a 0.123b 0.090 0.128b 0.111a 0.109a 0.117a 
DIAMONDS -1.630c -1.578c -1.248b -1.664c -1.656c -1.899c -1.755c 
REGULATED -1.578 -1.930a -2.371b -1.252 -2.055b -1.071 -1.208 
NUMBERAGE -1.620b -1.716b -1.395a -1.711b -1.675b -1.590a -1.670b 
LN_ ASSET 2.432c 2.507c 2.577c 2.389c 2.499c 2.433c 2.384c 
OFFICES 0.202c 0.202c 0.202c 0.202c 0.202c 0.205c 0.203c 
% FEMALE -10.347c -10.567c -9.813c -10.749c -10.354c -7.506c -10.092c 
% FEM.BOARD 2.721 2.396 2.888 2.772 2.606 2.400 2.730 
R-squared 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.48 0.47 
F-statistic 570.80 520.43 523.43 519.35 522.12 522.54 518.96 
Prob(F-stat) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Superscripts of a, b, and c correspond to statistical significance of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
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Table 4: Number of Deposit Accounts  
Outreach Measures of MFI's 
 
Tables 4 present the regression results for the Outreach Measure: Number of deposit accounts for: a) Overall Sample 
and b) six different geographic subsamples. In each panel, the first column of regression results corresponds to the 
Overall Sample, and column 2 through column 7 report results for 1) Africa, 2) East Asia, 3) East Europe & Central 
Asia, 4) Latin America and Caribbean, 5) North Africa and Middle East and 6) South East Asia. 
 
Explanatory variables consist two types of variables: a) Country Specific Variables [Ln_GDP is the natural log of 
country GDP size and GROWTH is the GDP growth and INFLATION for inflation]; b) Firms Specific Variables 
[DIAMONDS is the composite rating of MFIs reported in MixMarket Database, REGULATED is the dummy that is 
one if MFIs are regulated by a legal entity and zero otherwise, NUMBERAGE is a discrete variable that takes 1, 2 
and 3 if MFIs is ranked as New, Young or Mature, LN_ASSET is natural logarithm of MFIs asset size, OFFICES is 
number of branches, , % FEMALE  is the percentage of women borrower and % FEM.BOARD is the percentage of 
female board members. 
 
Superscripts of a, b,and c correspond to statistical significance of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
  
Number of Deposit Accounts 
 All East Asia 
& the 
Pacific 
Africa East 
Europe & 
Central 
Asia 
North 
Africa& 
Middle 
East 
South East 
Asia 
Latin 
America 
&Caribbean 
C 38.762c 38.670c 26.837c 40.998c 40.291c 30.239c 43.347c 
LN_GDP -1.518c -1.528c -1.216c -1.564c -1.573c -1.195c -1.636c 
GROWTH -0.076 -0.086 -0.089 -0.072 -0.102 0.025 0.024 
INFLATION 0.083 0.087 0.067 0.100 0.085 0.084 0.121 
DIAMONDS -1.417b -1.404b -1.098a -1.446b -1.461b -1.744c -1.978c 
REGULATED -1.413 -1.517 -2.060 -1.129 -1.916 -0.801 0.285 
NUMBERAGE -1.410 -1.437 -1.195 -1.491 -1.486 -1.370 -1.657 
LN_ ASSET 0.821b 0.843b 0.947b 0.789b 0.893b 0.823b 0.611 
OFFICES 0.30c 0.305c 0.305c 0.305c 0.305c 0.308c 0.307c 
% FEMALE -14.151c -14.210c -13.768c -14.528c -14.151c -10.748c -13.059c 
% FEM.BOARD 3.991 3.910 4.119 4.028 3.910 3.581 3.989 
R-squared 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 
F-statistic 742.27 674.77 677.22 674.98 677.76 678.78 676.76 
Prob(F-stat) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Table 5: Number of Active Borrowers 
Outreach Measures of MFI's  
 
Tables 5 present the regression results for the Outreach Measure: Number of active borrowers for: a) Overall Sample 
and b) six different geographic subsamples. In each panel, the first column of regression results corresponds to the 
Overall Sample, and column 2 through column 7 report results for 1) Africa, 2) East Asia, 3) East Europe & Central 
Asia, 4) Latin America and Caribbean, 5) North Africa and Middle East and 6) South East Asia. 
 
Explanatory variables consist two types of variables: a) Country Specific Variables [Ln_GDP is the natural log of 
country GDP size and GROWTH is the GDP growth and INFLATION for inflation]; b) Firms Specific Variables 
[DIAMONDS is the composite rating of MFIs reported in MixMarket Database, REGULATED is the dummy that is 
one if MFIs are regulated by a legal entity and zero otherwise, NUMBERAGE is a discrete variable that takes 1, 2 
and 3 if MFIs is ranked as New, Young or Mature, LN_ASSET is natural logarithm of MFIs asset size, OFFICES is 
number of branches, % FEMALE  is the percentage of women borrower and % FEM.BOARD is the percentage of 
female board members. 
 
 Number of Active Borrowers 
 All East Asia 
& the 
Pacific 
Africa East 
Europe & 
Central 
Asia 
North 
Africa& 
Middle 
East 
South East 
Asia 
Latin 
America 
&Caribbean 
C -39.303c -40.023c -38.888c -38.388c -38.758c -40.719c -39.717c 
LN_GDP 0.725c 0.690c 0.715c 0.706c 0.705c 0.779c 0.736c 
GROWTH 0.097 0.046 0.098 0.097 0.091 0.113 0.087 
INFLATION 0.035 0.054 0.036 0.041 0.036 0.036 0.032 
DIAMONDS -0.114 -0.048 -0.124 -0.137 -0.118 -0.160 -0.056 
REGULATED -1.606b -2.048c -1.583b -1.488b -1.803b -1.509b -1.772b 
NUMBERAGE -0.875a -0.963a -0.882a -0.903a -0.907a -0.877a -0.850a 
LN_ ASSET 1.469c 1.567c 1.464c 1.459c 1.496c 1.470c 1.487c 
OFFICES 0.209c 0.209c 0.209c 0.208c 0.208c 0.209c 0.208c 
% FEMALE 0.663 0.412 0.648 0.516 0.619 1.187 0.559 
% FEM.BOARD -4.132c -4.382c -4.138c -4.089c -4.136c -4.194c -4.140c 
R-squared 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 
F-statistic 1644.01 1504.23 1494.37 1494.64 1496.79 1494.94 1494.47 
Prob(F-stat) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Superscripts of a, b, and c correspond to statistical significance of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
 
Results show that country GDP has positive and highly statistically significant correlation with 
the number of active borrowers as for the overall sample as well as for the entire six geographic 
subsamples. The results are consistent with Demirgüç-Kunt and Klapper (2013), which imply that with 
inclusive financial systems, poor people can borrow to invest in their education and become 
entrepreneurs—and small enterprises can borrow as well to pursue promising growth opportunities. And 
this can contribute to higher economic growth. We find that the GDP has a negative and statistically 
significant impact on the number of depositors and the number of deposit account across the entire 
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geographic subsamples. Dupas and Robinson (2013) report survey evidence in poor countries suggesting 
that among the main reasons people did not save is that they do not trust the bank and service is 
unreliable. Chaia et al. (2009) find that only about 20% of households in Sub-Saharan Africa have access 
to banking. Ahlin, Lin, & Maio’s (2010) results “suggest that the country context is an important 
determinant of MFI performance, though not more so than MFI-specific factors”. 
We find that MFIs’ outreach is not responsive to country GDP growth for all three outreach 
measures and across all the six geographic subsamples. Our results show that inflation has impact on the 
number of depositors in all geographic regions, except for Africa, but has no effect on the number of 
active borrowers and the number of deposit accounts. 
MFIs’ Diamond rating reflects the level of information disclosed by MFIs to the MarketMix 
dataset. The results show that Diamond rating is not statistically significant for the number of active 
borrowers, while it is statistically significant for the number of depositors and the number of deposit 
account. The interpretation could be that borrowers may not care about the rating in choosing their MFI 
partner, since they are borrowing and not depositing money, while depositors has to be careful in 
selecting their MFI partner. Some interpretation in the literature is that MFIs customers may have no 
choice in selecting their MFI partner or not informed about rating. 
The variable “regulated” show whether the MFI is regulated by a legal entity or not. Our results 
show that regulation has negative and statistically significant impact on the number of active borrowers.  
Our finding support Makame and Murinde (2006), who find evidence for a negative relationship 
between regulation and outreach. Also, Cull et al. (2009) find that complying with regulation increases 
the cost to MFIs, so they respond by curtailing outreach to customers who are costly to reach. Christen, 
Lyman, and Rosenberg (2003) estimate the compliance costs of regulation and find that it is 5 percent of 
total assets during the first year and decreases to 1 percent after that. 
We find that the impact of MFIs’ maturity on two outreach measures: the number of depositors 
and number of borrowers is negative and statistically significant across the different geographic 
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subsamples. This can be explained by the fact that new MFIs are more proactive and have more 
innovative techniques to attract borrowers and depositors than mature firms. 
Our results show that increasing the number of offices increases MFIs’ outreach. The results are 
statistically significant across all the different geographic subsamples. So MFIs can indeed increase 
outreach by increasing the number of offices. But this may make sustainability an issue for MFIs because 
cost increases dramatically, especially in remote rural areas. Nonetheless, literature shows that new 
innovative techniques can assist in this matter. De Mel et al. (2013) find that installing a savings lockbox 
is less expensive, while it is as effective as sending a deposit collector to the village. 
We find that MFI size has positive and statistically significant impact on all three outreach 
measures for all geographic regions. Large MFIs have a cost advantage due to their economy of scope. 
We find that increasing the percent of female board member has negative and statistically 
significant impact on the number of depositors and the number of deposit accounts for all the geographic 
regions. Table 6 present the regression results of an additional outreach measure: the average loan balance 
per borrower.  
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Table 6: Average Loan Balance Per Borrower 
Outreach Measures of MFI's  
 
In Table 6 we report regression results for the Outreach measure: Average loan balance per borrower for: a) Overall 
Sample and b) six different geographic subsamples. In each panel, the first column of regression results corresponds 
to the Overall Sample, and column 2 through column 7 report results for 1) East Asia, 2) Africa, 3) East Europe & 
Central Asia, 4) North Africa and Middle East, 5) South East Asia, and 6) Latin America and Caribbean. 
 
Explanatory variables consist two types of variables: a) Country Specific Variables (Ln_GDP is the natural log of 
country GDP size and GROWTH is the GDP growth and INFLATION for inflation); b) Firms Specific Variables 
(DIAMONDS is the composite rating of MFIs reported in MixMarket Database, REGULATED is the dummy that is 
one if MFIs are regulated by a legal entity and zero otherwise, NUMBERAGE is a discrete variable that takes 1, 2 
and 3 if MFIs is ranked as New, Young or Mature, LN_ASSET is natural logarithm of MFIs asset size, OFFICES is 
number of branches, , % FEMALE  is the percentage of women borrower and % FEM.BOARD is the percentage of 
female board members 
 
 Average Loan Balance Per Borrower 
 All East Asia 
& the 
Pacific 
Africa East 
Europe & 
Central 
Asia 
North 
Africa& 
Middle 
East 
South 
East Asia 
Latin 
America 
&Caribbean 
C -3.122c -3.076c -1.154a -5.431c -3.013c -4.228c -2.907c 
LN_GDP 0.056c 0.058c 0.005 0.105c 0.052c 0.097c 0.050b 
GROWTH -0.021a -0.018 -0.018 -0.019a -0.022a -0.009 -0.016 
INFLATION -0.001 -0.002 0.003 -0.016c -0.001 0.000 0.001 
DIAMONDS -0.003 -0.007 -0.052 0.054 -0.004 -0.039 -0.033 
REGULATED 0.062 0.091 0.166a -0.237b 0.023 0.139 0.150 
NUMBERAGE -0.315c -0.309c -0.347c -0.248c -0.321c -0.317c -0.328c 
LN_ ASSET 0.361c 0.354c 0.340c 0.386c 0.366c 0.363c 0.351c 
OFFICES -0.002c -0.002c -0.002c -0.002c -0.002c -0.001c -0.002c 
% FEMALE -2.755c -2.737c -2.822c -2.373c -2.764c -2.343c -2.699c 
% FEM.BOARD 0.409b 0.426b 0.378b 0.301a 0.409b 0.362b 0.413b 
R-squared 0.1052 0.1062 0.1162 0.1480 0.1074 0.1133 0.1060 
F-statistic 75.39 78.40 86.70 114.63 79.14 84.33 78.21 
Prob(F-stat) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Superscripts of a, b, and c correspond to statistical significance of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
Results show that country GDP has positive and highly statistically significant correlation with 
the average loan balance per borrower for the overall sample as well as for the entire six geographic 
subsamples, except for Africa. We find that GDP growth negatively impacts the average loan per 
borrower except for two regions: East Europe & Central Asia and North Africa & Middle East.  Inflation 
has no impact on average loan per borrower except for Eastern European & Central Asian region, where 
the impact is negative and statistically significant. MFIs’ size has a positive and statistically significant 
impact on the average loan per borrower. Larger firms have the means to increase loan size and are better 
equipped to mitigate the credit risk. Number of MFIs’ branches has a negative and statistically significant 
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effect on loan size. It is possible that too many branches especially in remote areas increase cost and 
cause firms to decrease the amount for each loan. We find that an increase in the percentage of female 
board members leads to larger loan size. The results are statistically significant for the entire six 
geographic subsamples. That is an interesting result, given Bellucci et al. (2010) finding that “female 
officers tend to restrict credit availability to new, unestablished borrowers”. One interpretation could be 
that female executives are risk averse to new unreliable borrowers, but they are more comfortable in 
providing larger loans to established, less risky borrowers. 
A very interesting finding about the outreach depth emerges from our results. It adds to the debate 
centered on the commercial transformation of MFIs and the best strategy to expand outreach to socially 
marginalized population. We find a negative and highly statistically significant correlation between the 
percentage of female borrowers and loan size. This means that MFIs are increasingly focused on 
wealthier clients; a phenomenon termed by Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch (2007) a “mission drift”, 
which shows the existence of a trade-off between efficiency and outreach. One advantage of our dataset 
(2008-2015) is that it covers a period when more and more commercially oriented microfinance 
institutions entered the market. This fact ignites a key debate about the ultimate goals of microfinance 
(social vs. commercial goals), a debate between proponents of for-profits versus non-profit strategies in 
MFIs’ activities. Our results support the position of Mohammad Yunus, Grameen Bank founder and 
Nobel Peace Prize winner, who argues against the complete commercialization of microfinance. Yunus 
(2011), argued that “commercialization has been a terrible wrong turn for microfinance, and it indicates a 
worrying ‘mission drift’ in the motivation of those lending to the poor”. Indeed, there are undesired 
consequences for such phenomenon. Conning and Morduch (2011) report that “By the start of 2011, the 
Indian microfinance sector was in a full-blown crisis, with politicians accusing micro-lenders of 
aggressive loan collection practices, over-lending to indebted customers, and exploitative interest rates” . 
In this paper, we are not arguing for a strictly philanthropic path in MFIs’ activities. We are 
aligned with the advocates of a balance between the philanthropic and the commercial directions in MFIs’ 
activity. 
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4.3 Efficiency of MFIs 
Table 7: Cost Per Loan  
Efficiency of MFIs 
 
In Table 7 we report regression results for the efficiency measure: Cost per loan for: a) Overall Sample and b) six 
different geographic subsamples. In each panel, the first column of regression results corresponds to the Overall 
Sample, and column 2 through column 7 report results for 1) East Asia, 2) Africa, 3) East Europe & Central Asia, 4) 
North Africa and Middle East, 5) South East Asia, and 6) Latin America and Caribbean. 
 
Explanatory variables consist two types of variables: a) Country Specific Variables (Ln_GDP is the natural log of 
country GDP size and GROWTH is the GDP growth and INFLATION for inflation); b) Firms Specific Variables 
(DIAMONDS is the composite rating of MFIs reported in MixMarket Database, REGULATED is the dummy that is 
one if MFIs are regulated by a legal entity and zero otherwise, NUMBERAGE is a discrete variable that takes 1, 2 
and 3 if MFIs is ranked as New, Young or Mature, LN_ASSET is natural logarithm of MFIs asset size, OFFICES is 
number of branches, , % FEMALE  is the percentage of women borrower and % FEM.BOARD is the percentage of 
female board members 
 
 Cost per loan 
 All East Asia 
& the 
Pacific 
Africa East 
Europe & 
Central 
Asia 
North 
Africa& 
Middle 
East 
South 
East Asia 
Latin 
America 
&Caribbean 
C 4.845c 4.995c 5.052c 2.245c 4.976c 3.150c 5.242c 
LN_GDP 0.023 0.028 0.017 0.087c 0.018 0.091c 0.013 
GROWTH -0.073c -0.066c -0.073c -0.071c -0.075c -0.054c -0.064c 
INFLATION 0.006 0.004 0.007 -0.010 0.006 0.009 0.011 
DIAMONDS 0.009 -0.001 0.003 0.069 0.007 -0.059 -0.049 
REGULATED -0.099 -0.030 -0.088 -0.349c -0.145 0.042 0.054 
NUMBERAGE -0.860c -0.850c -0.865c -0.803c -0.863c -0.891c -0.893c 
LN_ ASSET 0.120c 0.103c 0.118c 0.141c 0.125c 0.120c 0.103c 
OFFICES -0.001c -0.001c -0.001c -0.001c -0.001c -0.001c -0.001c 
% FEMALE -3.956c -3.913c -3.962c -3.564c -3.960c -3.298c -3.850c 
% FEM.BOARD 0.352 0.399 0.349 0.252 0.348 0.266 0.359 
R-squared 0.0985 0.1019 0.0986 0.1212 0.1005 0.1117 0.1002 
F-statistic 67.33 63.55 61.27 77.27 62.66 70.46 62.40 
Prob(F-stat) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Superscripts of a,b, and c correspond to statistical significance of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
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Examining the efficiency of the MFIs, our results show that MFIs’ age, number of branches, and 
GDP growth have negative impact on efficiency. Also, the percentage of female borrowers has negative 
and highly statistically significant impact on the cost of loan. This finding is consistent with Hermes et al. 
(2011), who find that outreach and efficiency are negatively correlated.  
4.4 Financial Performance of MFIs 
Next, we analyze the results of three financial performance measures of MFIs: a) operational self-
sufficiency, b) return on asset, c) and profit margin. Table 8 presents regression results for the operational 
self-sufficiency of the MFIs. 
Table 8: Operational Self Sufficiency 
 Overall Financial Performance of MFIs 
 
In Table 8 we report regression results for the overall financial performance measure: Operational self- sufficiency 
for: a) Overall Sample and b) six different geographic subsamples. In each panel, the first column of regression 
results corresponds to the Overall Sample, and column 2 through column 7 report results for 1) East Asia, 2) Africa, 
3) East Europe & Central Asia, 4) North Africa and Middle East, 5) South East Asia, and 6) Latin America and 
Caribbean. 
 
Explanatory variables consist two types of variables: a) Country Specific Variables (Ln_GDP is the natural log of 
country GDP size and GROWTH is the GDP growth and INFLATION for inflation); b) Firms Specific Variables 
(DIAMONDS is the composite rating of MFIs reported in MixMarket Database, REGULATED is the dummy that is 
one if MFIs are regulated by a legal entity and zero otherwise, NUMBERAGE is a discrete variable that takes 1, 2 
and 3 if MFIs is ranked as New, Young or Mature, LN_ASSET is natural logarithm of MFIs asset size, OFFICES is 
number of branches, , % FEMALE  is the percentage of women borrower and % FEM.BOARD is the percentage of 
female board members 
 
Operational Self Sufficiency 
 All East Asia 
& the 
Pacific 
Africa East Europe 
& Central 
Asia 
North 
Africa& 
Middle East 
South 
East Asia 
Latin 
America 
&Caribbean 
C 0.7195c 0.7122c 0.9980c 0.5149c 0.6769c 0.6139c 0.6396c 
LN_GDP -0.0040 -0.0045 -0.0111b 0.0006 -0.0025 0.0000 -0.0018 
GROWTH 0.0085c 0.0079c 0.0089c 0.0087c 0.0091c 0.0097c 0.0066b 
INFLATION 0.0014 0.0016 0.0019 0.0000 0.0013 0.0014 0.0006 
DIAMONDS 0.0143 0.0150 0.0070 0.0189a 0.0145 0.0106 0.0252b 
REGULATED -0.0182 -0.0235 -0.0028 -0.0455b -0.0023 -0.0109 -0.0511b 
NUMBERAGE 0.0007 -0.0002 -0.0035 0.0071 0.0036 0.0007 0.0058 
LN_ ASSET 0.0212c 0.0223c 0.0182c 0.0233c 0.0190c 0.0212c 0.0248c 
OFFICES 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
% FEMALE 0.1157c 0.1125c 0.1032c 0.1458c 0.1180c 0.1554c 0.0955c 
% FEM.BOARD 0.0597 0.0569 0.0570 0.0503 0.0600 0.0549 0.0577 
R-squared 0.0059 0.0065 0.0102 0.0127 0.0131 0.0075 0.0080 
F-statistic 4.44 4.44 6.96 8.69 8.97 5.08 5.44 
Prob(F-stat) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Superscripts of a, b, and c correspond to statistical significance of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
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We find that GDP growth and MFIs’ size have positive and statistically significant effects on 
operational self-sufficiency. One more interesting result emerges: we find that an increase in the 
percentage of female borrower will increase MFI self-sufficiency. The results are consistent with the 
previous literature. Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch (2007) find that female borrowers are less risky, 
as they are more risk averse in their investment decisions. Beck, Behr, and Güttler (2013) find that 
repayment rates among female borrowers are higher than for male. Table 9 presents regression results for 
the return on asset.  
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Table 9:  Return on Assets 
Overall Financial Performance of MFIs 
 
In Table 9 we report regression results for the overall financial performance measures: Return on assets for: a) 
Overall Sample and b) six different geographic subsamples. In each panel, the first column of regression results 
corresponds to the Overall Sample, and column 2 through column 7 report results for 1) East Asia, 2) Africa, 3) East 
Europe & Central Asia, 4) North Africa and Middle East, 5) South East Asia, and 6) Latin America and Caribbean. 
 
Explanatory variables consist two types of variables: a) Country Specific Variables (Ln_GDP is the natural log of 
country GDP size and GROWTH is the GDP growth and INFLATION for inflation); b) Firms Specific Variables 
(DIAMONDS is the composite rating of MFIs reported in MixMarket Database, REGULATED is the dummy that is 
one if MFIs are regulated by a legal entity and zero otherwise, NUMBERAGE is a discrete variable that takes 1, 2 
and 3 if MFIs is ranked as New, Young or Mature, LN_ASSET is natural logarithm of MFIs asset size, OFFICES is 
number of branches, , % FEMALE  is the percentage of women borrower and % FEM.BOARD is the percentage of 
female board members 
 
Return on Assets 
 All East Asia 
& the 
Pacific 
Africa East Europe 
& Central 
Asia 
North 
Africa& 
Middle East 
South East 
Asia 
Latin 
America 
&Caribbean 
C -0.1586c -0.1605c -0.1188c -0.1934c -0.1624c -0.1817c -0.1688c 
LN_GDP 0.0016c 0.0014b 0.0005c 0.0023c 0.0017c 0.0024c 0.0018c 
GROWTH 0.0013c 0.0012c 0.0014c 0.0014c 0.0014c 0.0016c 0.0011c 
INFLATION 0.0003b 0.0004b 0.0004c 0.0001 0.0003b 0.0003b 0.0002 
DIAMONDS 0.0023a 0.0025b 0.0013 0.0031b 0.0023a 0.0015 0.0037c 
REGULATED 0.0018 0.0004 0.0040 -0.0028 0.0032 0.0034 -0.0024 
NUMBERAGE 0.0111c 0.0109c 0.0105c 0.0122c 0.0114c 0.0111c 0.0118c 
LN_ ASSET 0.0046c 0.0049c 0.0042c 0.0050c 0.0044c 0.0046c 0.0051c 
OFFICES 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
% FEMALE 0.0042 0.0034 0.0024 0.0093b 0.0044 0.0129c 0.0016 
% FEM.BOARD 0.0259c 0.0252c 0.0255c 0.0243c 0.0259c 0.0249c 0.0257c 
R-squared 0.021 0.024 0.0268 0.0336 0.025 0.026 0.023 
F-statistic 16.33 16.57 18.62 23.44 17.31 18.03 16.03 
Prob(F-stat) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Superscripts of a, b, and c correspond to statistical significance of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
 
We find that Country GDP size and GDP growth have positive and statistically significant 
impacts on the return on asset (ROA) for the overall sample as well as for the entire six geographic 
subsamples. 
 So MFIs are more likely to earn better ROA in larger GDP countries. This makes MFIs 
sustainability more difficult is poorer, less developed countries.  
MFIs’ Diamond rating has a positive and significant impact on ROA for the all geographic 
regions except for Africa and South East Asia. We find that the percentage of female borrowers, the 
number of branches, and MFI regulation have no impact on ROA, while MFIs’ size, age, and the 
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percentage of female board members have positive and statistically significant impact on ROA. Table 10 
presents regression results for the profit margin. 
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Table 10:  Profit Margin  
Overall Financial Performance of MFIs 
 
In Table 10 we report regression results for the overall financial performance measures: Profit margin for: a) Overall 
Sample and b) six different geographic subsamples. In each panel, the first column of regression results corresponds 
to the Overall Sample, and column 2 through column 7 report results for 1) East Asia, 2) Africa, 3) East Europe & 
Central Asia, 4) North Africa and Middle East, 5) South East Asia, and 6) Latin America and Caribbean. 
 
Explanatory variables consist two types of variables: a) Country Specific Variables (Ln_GDP is the natural log of 
country GDP size and GROWTH is the GDP growth and INFLATION for inflation); b) Firms Specific Variables 
(DIAMONDS is the composite rating of MFIs reported in MixMarket Database, REGULATED is the dummy that is 
one if MFIs are regulated by a legal entity and zero otherwise, NUMBERAGE is a discrete variable that takes 1, 2 
and 3 if MFIs is ranked as New, Young or Mature, LN_ASSET is natural logarithm of MFIs asset size, OFFICES is 
number of branches, , % FEMALE  is the percentage of women borrower and % FEM.BOARD is the percentage of 
female board members 
 
 Profit Margin 
 All East Asia 
& the 
Pacific 
Africa East Europe 
& Central 
Asia 
North 
Africa& 
Middle 
East 
South East 
Asia 
Latin 
America 
&Caribbean 
C 12.779 12.935 15.115 13.725 12.955 11.689 15.760 
LN_GDP 0.201 0.212 0.142 0.181 0.195 0.243 0.120 
GROWTH -0.089 -0.075 -0.087 -0.090 -0.092 -0.077 -0.017 
INFLATION -0.110 -0.115 -0.106 -0.103 -0.109 -0.109 -0.078 
DIAMONDS -0.386 -0.405 -0.442 -0.409 -0.387 -0.425 -0.812 
REGULATED -2.810 -2.684 -2.681 -2.687 -2.879 -2.732 -1.548 
NUMBERAGE -3.922b -3.899b -3.957b -3.951b -3.932b -3.926b -4.121b 
LN_ ASSET -0.165 -0.192 -0.190 -0.175 -0.156 -0.164 -0.302 
OFFICES 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 
% FEMALE -0.625 -0.537 -0.726 -0.776 -0.636 -0.204 0.172 
% FEM.BOARD 8.092a 8.169a 8.066b 8.133a 8.090a 8.044a 8.179a 
R-squared 0.0016 0.0017 0.0017 0.0016 0.0016 0.0017 0.0019 
F-statistic 1.19 1.10 1.10 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.27 
Prob(F-stat) 0.2948 0.3564 0.3585 0.3673 0.3675 0.3659 0.2348 
Superscripts of a, b, and c correspond to statistical significance of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
 
 Several interesting findings emerge. Our results show that an increase in the percentage of 
female board member has a positive and statistically significant effect on MFIs’ profitability. This is true 
for the overall sample as well as for the entire six geographic regions. The results are consistent with 
Mersland and Strøm (2009) who find that financial performance improves with a female CEO. We find 
that female empowerment improves profitability for MFIs as well as ROA. So Microfinance institutions, 
policymakers, and regulators should promote female participation in leading positions in MFIs and help 
women break existing glass ceilings. 
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We did not find a negative and statistically significant correlation between the percentage of 
female borrowers (which measures the depth of outreach) and profitability. This results point to another 
interesting finding: outreach does not lead to decreased profitability. That means we do not detect 
evidence of a trade-off between profitability and outreach, a key debate among policymakers and 
practitioners. Yunus (2011) argues that it is “possible to harness investment in microcredit—and even 
make a profit—without working through either charities or global financial markets” .  
 Indeed, we argue that outreach does not necessarily exclude profitability. We recognize that 
achieving profitability is a challenging task for MFIs given the multiple barriers facing them. Information 
asymmetry, the lack of collateral, illiteracy, and several other factors make it very costly for MFIs to 
provide financial services to the poor. Nonetheless, MFIs have created various innovative techniques that 
mitigate the cost and the risk. Beck ( 2015) lists several such techniques “including (i) joint liability 
lending, (ii)dynamic incentives, (iii) high repayment frequency, and (iv) focus on women” . Also we 
believe that MFIs should provide a better management in running their activities. Hassan and Sanchez 
(2009) investigate technical and scale efficiencies of MFIs in three regions and find inefficiency is higher 
in some regions. More importantly, they find that “the source of inefficiency is pure technical rather than 
scale, suggesting that MFIs are either wasting resources or not producing enough outputs (making enough 
loans, raising funds, and getting more borrowers)” . So good management matters in MFIs’ activity.  
In conclusion, we believe that MFIs can indeed achieve both profitability and outreach given they 
implement the various cost- and risk-reducing techniques and provide better management. 
5.  CONCLUSION 
The objective of this paper is to estimate the impact of country-specific macro-variables and firm-
specific attributes on the financial performance and the efficiency of microfinance institutions (MFIs). We 
use a large international up-to-date database consisting of over 10,000 firm-years for MFIs in over 89 
countries during the period 2008-2015. Results show that country GDP has positive and highly 
statistically significant correlation with the number of active borrowers for the overall sample as well as 
for the entire six geographic subsamples, while it has a negative and statistically significant impact on the 
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number of depositors and the number of deposit account. We find that MFIs’ outreach is not responsive to 
country GDP growth for all three outreach measures and across all six geographic subsamples. Diamond 
rating has no impact on the number of active borrowers, while it affects the number of depositors and the 
number of deposit account. Regulation has negative and statistically significant impact on the number of 
active borrowers. The impact of MFIs’ maturity on two outreach measures: the number of depositors and 
number of borrowers is negative and statistically significant across the different geographic subsamples. 
Increasing the number of offices increases MFIs outreach. We find that country GDP has positive and   
highly significantly correlation with the average loan balance per borrower for the overall sample as well 
as for the entire six geographic subsamples, while inflation has no impact on it except for Eastern 
European & Central Asian region where the impact is negative and statistically significant.  
Our results show that MFIs’ size has a positive and statistically significant impact on the average 
loan per borrower. Larger firms have the means to increase loan size and are better equipped to mitigate 
credit risk. We find a negative and highly statistically significant correlation between the percentage of 
female borrowers and loan size, which means that MFIs are increasingly focused on wealthier clients; a 
phenomenon termed by Cull et al. (2007) a “mission drift.” Our results show that MFIs age, the numbers 
of branches, and GDP growth have negative impact on efficiency. And the percentage of female 
borrowers has a negative and highly statistically significant impact on the cost of loan. We find that GDP 
growth and MFIs’ size have positive and statistically significant effects on operational self-sufficiency. 
One interesting results on female empowerment is that an increase in the percentage of female borrowers 
will increase MFI self-sufficiency. GDP growth has a positive and statistically significant impact on the 
return on asset (ROA) for the overall sample and as well as for the entire six geographic subsamples. So 
MFIs are more likely to earn better ROA in larger GDP countries. 
We find that MFIs’ size, age, and the percentage of female board members have positive and 
statistically significant impact on ROA. Our results show that female empowerment improves 
profitability for MFIs as well as ROA. So Microfinance institutions, policymakers, and regulators should 
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promote female participation in leading position in MFIs and help women break existing glass ceilings. 
We do not detect evidence of a trade-off between profitability and outreach.  
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